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Abstract 
 
The Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) was developed to replace the Internet Protocol version 
4 (IPv4). IPv6 provides many improvements over IPv4. However, there are major problems 
with new features introduced in IPv6, which are susceptible to threats such as Denial of 
Service (DoS) attacks. In a DoS attack, malicious network traffic is sent to the victim node to 
prevent it from gaining access to network resources. DoS attacks on internal IPv6 networks 
are among the security concerns of many organisations.  
 
The Neighbour Discovery Protocol (NDP) was introduced in IPv6. NDP processes use the 
Internet Control Message Protocol for IPv6 (ICMPv6). For example, the NDP Stateless 
Address Autoconfiguration process uses ICMPv6 Router Advertisement messages (Router 
Advertisements). Router Advertisements enable computers on an IPv6 network to generate 
IPv6 addresses for themselves. Router Advertisements can be misused to launch a link-local 
IPv6 DoS attacks called Router Advertisement flood attacks. 
 
The purpose of this research was to evaluate existing defence mechanisms against three 
types of Router Advertisement flood attacks. ACL, ACL Fragments, ACL Undetermined-
transport, Disable Router Discovery, RA Guard, Validate Source MAC and VLAN were the 
defence mechanisms that were evaluated. A testbed was deployed and experiments were 
conducted by measuring the TCP throughput, TCP round-trip time (RTT) and CPU utilisation 
using the latest Windows and Linux operating systems namely Windows 8.1 and Debian 
7.5.0. Data was gathered before and during attacks as well as after the defence 
mechanisms were used. ACL and ACL Undetermined-transport were the most effective 
defences and Disable Router Discovery, RA Guard and Validate Source MAC were the least 
effective defences. Overall, the performance of Debian 7.5.0 was better than Windows 8.1. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview of IPv6 Addressing Architecture 
 
The Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) was introduced by the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) to replace Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4). It was developed primarily due to 
the exhaustion of IPv4 addresses on the Internet. IPv6 provides many improvements over 
IPv4 including a larger address space (Sharma, 2010).  
 
Details Abbreviation 
Full IPv6 address 2001:0db8:0000:0000:cafe:0000:1200:f1b2 
Deleting leading zeros in each block 2001:db8:0:0:cafe:0:1200:f1b2 
Double colon for consecutive zeros 2001:db8::cafe:0:1200:f1b2 
Table 1-1: IPv6 Address Abbreviation (Weber, 2013). 
 
Table 1-1 shows how IPv6 addresses are abbreviated. An IPv6 address is 128 bits in length 
and is represented in eight groups of hexadecimal values separated by colons. It is easier to 
read IPv6 addresses when they are abbreviated. The second abbreviation shown can only 
be used once (Weber, 2013). 
 
In addition to the type of address shown in Table 1-1, there are some special IPv6 
addresses. For example when a host joins a network, it has the unspecified address, 
0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 and is usually represented as two colons (::). Another special address is the 
IPv6 loopback address (0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1 or ::) which is assigned to the network interface 
(Sande, 2014). 
 
IPv6 addressing models include unicast and multicast. Unicast addresses are used by a 
node to communicate with another node. On the contrary, multicast addresses are used by a 
node to communicate with multiple nodes. According to Hinden & Deering (2003), an 
example of a multicast address is ff02::1. The address is known as the all-nodes multicast 
address. Each IPv6 interface has this address. Thus, a single packet can be sent to all 
interfaces within the local link using this multicast address. 
 
2 
 
 
A node uses the unspecified address :: mentioned earlier as its source address before it has 
a configured IPv6 address. When an IPv6 node joins a network, it creates a link-local IPv6 
address to establish a network connection. This usually occurs using an interface identifier 
for example, a Media Access Control (MAC) address. Link-local addresses of nodes can 
only be used on the network link. They are not routable addresses so they cannot be used 
for communication between two networks (Sande, 2014).  
 
 
Figure 1-1: Examples of IPv6 Addresses (Bothra & Chandar, 2012). 
 
Figure 1-1 shows examples of IPv6 addresses. Each interface has a link-local address. An 
interface usually uses one link-local and one or more global IPv6 addresses. Global IPv6 
addresses are created by a node after it is able to configure a link-local address. A node 
sends a message to the all-routers multicast address, ff02::2 using its link-local address to 
find local routers. Routers in an IPv6 network join the all nodes all-routers multicast group 
(ff02::2). If a router is present, it will send prefix information to the node using the all-nodes 
multicast address, ff02::1 (Sande, 2014).  
 
Details Address 
Global Routing Prefix 2001:db8:72ed::/48 
Subnet ID 0001 
Subnet Prefix on that link 2001:db8:72ed:1::/64 
MAC address from the interface card 00:40:d0:8d:45:46 
Interface ID with EUI-64 0240:d0ff:fe8d:4546 
Table 1-2: The IPv6 Address Scheme (Weber, 2013). 
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Table 1-2 shows the address scheme used in IPv6. The prefix identifies a network. Global 
addresses are generated using an interface identifier (normally a MAC address) just like link-
local addresses, except that the prefix is obtained by the node from a router. Global IPv6 
addresses are routable across the public Internet (Sande, 2014). Extended Unique Identifier 
(EUI-64) shown in Table 1-2 is the network interface identifier defined by IEEE (Hinden & 
Deering, 2003). 
 
1.2 IPv6 Security 
 
Even though IPv6 has been around for more than 16 years, most organisations are still 
planning to deploy IPv6 or have only deployed it partially. Thus, the growth of IPv6 traffic is 
expected to be slow (Anstee, Bussiere & Sockrider, 2012). The migration from IPv4 to IPv6 
has taken a long time due to a number of reasons including those related to IPv6 security. 
According to Barker (2013), network engineers have spent years improving IPv4 security 
and vendors have continued to provide several features in devices to protect networks from 
IPv4 attacks.  
 
The vendors began integrating similar features in IPv6 devices since IPv6 is vulnerable to 
many attacks, which are similar to the attacks used against IPv4. However, there are new 
features in IPv6, which may be misused by attackers. This is where a gap exists in vendors’ 
solutions and network engineers’ understanding of IPv6 attacks (Barker, 2013). Various 
types of attacks can be used to exploit the new features in IPv6 such as Denial of Service 
(DoS) attacks (Durdagi & Buldu, 2010).  
 
1.3 Denial of Service Attacks 
 
In a Denial of Service (DoS) attack, a malicious node is used to stop the victim node from 
communicating with other nodes on the network (Beck, Cholez, Festor & Chrisment, 2007). 
DoS attacks can prevent the victim node from processing requests received from other 
nodes. The attacks can occur in various ways. An attacker can exploit software 
vulnerabilities present in the victim node or generate masses of malicious packets (Stewart, 
2013). 
 
In 1987, the first major DoS attack was launched in Europe by an IBM employee. It has been 
known as an email worm. The attack made headlines as IBM’s corporate network became 
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overloaded and crashed in both Europe and USA (Bosworth, Kabay & Whyne, 2012). Large 
companies such as Amazon, Microsoft and AT&T have also been victims of DoS attacks in 
the past (Dulaney, 2011). Today, such attacks continue to cause considerable damage to 
the productivity and revenues of corporate networks due to system downtime and recovery 
(Bosworth et al., 2012).  
 
1.4 DoS Attacks on Internal Networks 
 
Not all DoS attacks occur on web servers, which do not have a direct connection to the 
internal network of an organisation. Attackers can use malware to gain access to the internal 
network (Stewart, 2013). Anstee et al. (2013) stated that a survey was conducted in 2012 to 
determine security concerns of organisations such as those regarding internal IPv6 
networks. The survey included respondents from 130 organisations.  
 
According to Anstee et al. (2012), 70% of the respondents mentioned that DoS attacks were 
among their IPv6 security concerns. This probably meant that respondents were taking more 
interest in monitoring and protecting the availability of services on their internal IPv6 
networks. Around 50% of the respondents experienced compromised hosts on their internal 
networks (Anstee et al., 2012). 
 
1.5 IPv6 DoS Mitigation Techniques 
 
Since a DoS attack can have a direct impact on an organisations’ ability to provide services, 
more commercial and governmental organisations are investing in resources to prevent DoS 
attacks (Raghavan & Dawson, 2011).  
 
Major IT equipment and software vendors have published IPv6 DoS vulnerabilities for their 
implementations (Dawood, 2012). For example, Juniper, HP, Sun Microsystems, OpenBSD, 
Cisco, Microsoft and Linux have published their software vulnerabilities while attempting to 
fix them (Hauser, 2008). 
 
1.6 Related Works 
 
The Neighbour Discovery Protocol (NDP) is one of the main protocols used with IPv6. NDP 
processes include Router Discovery (RD) and Stateless Address Autoconfiguration 
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(SLAAC). RD enables nodes to find routers and SLAAC provides network parameters to 
enable hosts to generate IPv6 addresses for themselves (Supriyanto, Murugesan, Osman & 
Ramadass, 2013). Both RD and SLAAC need Internet Protocol version 6 (ICMPv6) Router 
Advertisement messages (Router Advertisements). 
 
As Router Advertisements do not need to be authenticated, they can be used to launch link-
local DoS attacks such as Router Advertisement (RA) flood attacks. According to Bowne & 
Prince (2013), RA flood attacks were discovered in 2011. Alangar & Swaminathan (2013) 
mentioned that even though RA flood attacks were discovered some time ago, they can still 
be exploited today. At present, it is difficult to find published research specific to defence 
mechanisms against RA flood attacks. Many researchers are working on defence 
mechanisms against NDP attacks in general.  
 
Rafiee, Alsa’deh & Meinel (2011) stated that NDP is vulnerable to several types of attacks. 
The Secure Neighbour Discovery (SEND) protocol was developed to protect the network 
from NDP attacks. SEND is not used widely, as it cannot be implemented effortlessly. It is 
mostly available for Linux and OpenBSD. Rafiee et al. (2011) developed SEND for Windows 
operating systems (WinSEND). They tested WinSEND using numerous experiments on a 
real network. IPv6 addresses could be generated for nodes securely using cryptography. 
WinSEND could be configured to drop packets sent by nodes, which were not authorised 
using the cryptographic mechanism to prevent DoS attacks (Rafiee et al., 2011). 
 
Hassan, Ahmed & Osman (2014) proposed a new defence mechanism against NDP security 
threats. The defence mechanism performed mapping and binding between IPv6 addresses, 
MAC addresses and public keys of the network nodes. As a result, the mechanism 
prevented IP address spoofing which is often used in DoS attacks. The experiments were 
conducted using a simulation LAN. The results showed that the proposed defence 
mechanism was able to detect different types of threats including spoofing and DoS attacks 
(Hassan et al., 2014). 
 
Beck et al. (2007) developed the Neighbour Discovery Protocol Monitor (NDPMon). The tool 
maintained a database of nodes, which included correspondences between IPv6 and 
Ethernet addresses, together with timestamps. When an NDP packet was captured, the 
packet contents were compared to the database entries. Beck et al. (2007) used a validation 
testbed to generate attacks for example, DoS attacks. NDPMon sent an email report to the 
network administrator when it detected anomalies in packets (Beck et al., 2007). 
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Schutte, Scheffler & Schnor (2012) developed a new Snort IDS plugin called IPv6-Plugin for 
Snort IDS to detect attacks specific to IPv6. The most important objective of developing 
IPv6-Plugin was to monitor messages used for the SLAAC process, which was discussed 
earlier in this section. The IPv6-Plugin could carry out stateless checks on all IPv6 packets 
for consistency and triggered an alert when new routers or hosts connected to the network 
(Schutte et al., 2012). 
 
Supriyanto et al. (2013) proposed a new security mechanism called Trust Based Security 
(TBS) for IPv6. Cryptographic methods usually increase latency due to calculations that 
need to be performed. However, theoretical evaluation of the proposed mechanism showed 
that there was a reduction in bandwidth consumption when the mechanism was compared to 
SEND (discussed earlier in this section) and other cryptography-based mechanisms. The 
mechanism ensured integrity and availability of NDP messages (Supriyanto et al., 2013). 
 
1.7 Motivation for this Research  
 
There are many link-local IPv6 threats such as DoS attacks. Some researchers have 
discussed existing and new defence mechanisms against various link-local IPv6 DoS attacks 
including Router Advertisement (RA) flood attacks. Others have developed and tested a 
number of new defence mechanisms against such attacks. However, no one has conducted 
experiments to compare the efficiency of defences against RA flood attacks in the studied 
literature. In addition, existing literature does not include a comparison of defences against 
RA flood attacks using the latest Windows and Linux operating systems such as Windows 
8.1 and Debian 7.5.0.  
 
1.8 Research Contribution 
 
As discussed in the previous section, researchers have not compared defence mechanisms 
against RA flood attacks using the latest operating systems. Thus, the purpose of this 
research was to conduct experiments to compare the efficacies of defence mechanisms 
against RA flood attacks using Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0. The defence mechanisms 
used for this study were Access Control Lists, Disable Router Discovery, RA Guard, Validate 
Source MAC and VLAN. Experiments were conducted by measuring the TCP throughput, 
TCP round-trip time (RTT) and CPU utilisation using Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0. 
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1.9 Structure of this Thesis 
 
This thesis comprises seven chapters. Chapter 1 covers the introduction to this research. It 
contains a discussion on IPv6 DoS attacks, related works, details on the motivation for this 
research followed by the research contribution. Chapter 2 describes DoS attacks on IPv6 
networks as well as some mitigation techniques that may be used against such attacks. 
Chapter 3 includes a detailed discussion on RA flood attacks. The chapter covers how 
Router Advertisements are used and how RA flood attacks can occur. The chapter also 
describes the tools used to launch RA flood attacks and the defence mechanisms against 
such attacks. 
 
Chapter 4 contains the hypotheses and the research method. The chapter also outlines the 
process used to review literature followed by the data collection process used to conduct this 
research. Chapter 5 contains details on hardware and software used to set up the network 
testbed in the computer laboratory. In addition, the chapter describes the tools used to 
conduct experiments and includes details on how the defence mechanisms were configured. 
Chapter 6 presents the analysis of TCP throughput, TCP RTT and CPU utilisation results 
gathered from experiments using Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0. Finally, Chapter 7 contains 
the summary, conclusions and future works. 
 
1.10 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter provided an overview of the IPv6 addressing architecture and IPv6 security 
followed by the impact of DoS attacks on IPv6 networks. Mitigation techniques against IPv6 
DoS attacks were discussed briefly followed by related works on defences against NDP 
attacks such as RA flood attacks. Then the motivation for this research and the research 
contribution were explained. Finally, the structure of this thesis was discussed. The next 
chapter covers IPv6 DoS attacks. 
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Chapter 2 
 
IPv6 Denial of Service Attacks 
 
This chapter covers the impact of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks on IPv6 networks. Section 
2.1 explains the impact of DoS attacks in general. Section 2.2 includes a discussion on how 
DoS attacks can be classified into low-rate and flooding-based attacks. Section 2.3 covers 
link-local IPv6 DoS attacks. Section 2.4 describes multicast addresses used in IPv6, which 
can be misused to launch DoS attacks. Section 2.5 covers the IPv6 Neighbour Discovery 
Protocol (NDP) and types of attacks that can be launched by exploiting NDP processes such 
as Stateless Address Autoconfiguration, Duplicate Address Detection, Address Resolution 
and Router Redirect. Finally, Section 2.6 provides a brief discussion on how the local 
network can be protected from NDP DoS attacks. 
 
2.1 Overview of Denial of Service Attacks 
 
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) developed IPv6 to address the limitations of 
IPv4 (Kaur & Sharma, 2014). However, some IPv4 security vulnerabilities continue to exist in 
IPv6. For example, both IPv4 and IPv6 networks are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) 
attacks. 
 
DoS attacks attempt to stop legitimate nodes from gaining access to network resources. 
During a DoS attack, a malicious node causes the victim node to stop communicating with 
all nodes or a specific node on the link (Beck et al., 2007). Even though a DoS attack 
violates the security of a network, it does not involve theft of information. Instead, it attempts 
to terminate network connections (Shrivastava, Sharma, & Rai, 2010). 
 
Any operating system can be targeted for a DoS attack because such attacks are aimed at 
the Internet Protocol (IP). Thus, any operating system running IPv4 or IPv6 can be attacked 
(Bosworth et al., 2012). Even though DoS attacks often affect IP network services, they can 
also affect VoIP and other real-time services (Brashars, 2007). Attackers often use spoofing 
to hide the source of the DoS attack. For example, IP address spoofing or MAC address 
spoofing (Tripathi & Mehtre, 2013).  
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2.2 Classification of Denial of Service Attacks 
 
A DoS attack is launched using a single computer. It is not as complicated as a DDoS 
attack. Many compromised computers called zombies are used simultaneously in a DDoS 
attack (Tripathi & Mehtre, 2013).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1: Classification of DoS attacks (P. Jain, J. Jain & Gupta, 2011). 
 
Figure 2.1 shows that DoS attacks can be classified into software exploits such as viruses 
and worms or flooding-based attacks. Flooding-based attacks may originate from a single 
source (DoS) or multiple sources (DDoS). 
 
2.2.1 Software Exploits 
 
A software exploit is a low-rate DoS attack that keeps a low profile so that it cannot be 
detected easily. The attacker uses malicious codes to exploit system vulnerabilities in order 
to prevent legitimate users from gaining access to services or resources (Mathew, 2013). 
 
2.2.2 Flooding 
 
In a flooding-based DoS attack, an attacker continuously sends large quantities of packets to 
a network node to deplete resources that are available for legitimate users. As a result, the 
victim node is unable to process the flood of malicious packets and becomes unresponsive 
(Saad, Ramadass, & Manickam, 2013). An attacker may redirect traffic from other nodes to 
the victim node (Raghavan & Dawson, 2011). The attack packets may cause network 
congestion and exhaust the victim node’s resources such as CPU, memory or bandwidth. 
Denial of Service 
Flooding Software Exploit 
Worms Viruses Multi-Source Single Source 
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Thus, the attack can disrupt or stop network communication among the victim and other 
nodes (Kaur & Sharma, 2014).  
 
2.3 DoS Attacks against Internal Networks 
 
Published research on IPv6 security is mostly on link-local attacks. Such attacks may seem 
trivial, as the attacker needs to gain access to the local IPv6 network to launch them. 
However, attackers can gain access to the local network in many ways (Sande, 2014).  
 
Organisations often set up internal networks to prevent malicious packets from passing 
through a firewall or a Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) without being authenticated. However, a 
firewall or DMZ may not be able to stop a DoS attack from occurring (Shrivastava et al.,  
2010).  
 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Demilitarised zone (DMZ) (Ciampa, 2008). 
 
Figure 2.2 shows a DMZ and the internal LAN both of which are protected by a firewall. Not 
all attacks are on web servers which are usually located in the DMZ and do not have a direct 
connection to the internal LAN. Attackers can use malware to evade firewalls in order to gain 
access to the internal LAN (Stewart, 2013).  
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An insider is a trusted individual from the organisation. If malicious insiders launch attacks, it 
is difficult to detect them since insiders are usually familiar with security mechanisms of the 
organisation’s network (Tomar & Tyagi, 2014). Many organisations have experienced 
network attacks from malicious insiders (Anstee et al., 2012).  
 
A link-local DoS attack cannot be prevented using encryption and integrity checks which are 
normally used against attacks that occur outside the network. DoS attack packets may be 
signed by a server and they may comprise real or fake IP addresses. The attack packets 
may also be encrypted using a fictitious key. These cannot prevent attacks and an attacker 
can flood the devices within an internal network causing them to fail (Brashars, 2007). 
 
2.3.1 DoS Attacks via IPv6 Tunnelling  
 
If a business is not running IPv6, the assumption is that, the IPv4 network is protected from 
IPv6 attacks (Bothra & Chandar, 2012). However, network administrators may not know that 
hidden IPv6 tunnelling is occurring in a network, which is supposed to cope with IPv4 only. A 
malicious IPv6 device may be present on the network (Frankel, Graveman, Pearce & Rooks, 
2010). Many operating systems such as Windows 7, Linux, MAC OS/X have IPv6 enabled 
by default (Bothra & Chandar, 2012).  
 
 
Figure 2-3: IPv6 over IPv4 Tunnels (Frankel et al., 2010). 
 
Figure 2-3 depicts how IPv6 tunnels relate to existing IPv4 networks. IPv6 traffic can be 
tunnelled via IPv4 thus bypassing security controls that are intended for IPv4 only. In fact, 
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the IPv6 over IPv4 tunnel can be a backdoor into the internal network. Attackers can utilise 
IPv4 to IPv6 transition mechanisms such as Teredo to launch DoS attacks. IPv6 over IPv4 
tunnelling protocols are visible to edge devices like routers and firewalls even if such devices 
cannot secure encapsulated IPv6 packets (Frankel et al., 2010). 
 
Traditional network security tools like Intrusion Detection Systems that work in IPv4 
environments only are not effective for IPv6 transition mechanisms such as tunnelling. The 
tools may fail to detect anomalies during an IPv6 flooding-based DoS attack (Bahaman, 
Prabuwono, Mas’ud & Abdollah, 2012). 
 
2.4 IPv6 DoS Vulnerabilities  
 
There are major problems with new features introduced in IPv6, which can be exploited such 
as, dependence on multicast addresses and new types of Internet Control Message Protocol 
version 6 (ICMPv6) messages (Durdagi & Buldu, 2010). The following sections discuss how 
attackers can misuse the aforementioned IPv6 features to launch DoS attacks. 
 
2.4.1 DoS Attacks that Exploit IPv6 Multicast Addresses  
 
When packets are sent to all nodes within a subnet, it is known as broadcast. IPv4 uses 
broadcasts. In IPv6, broadcasts have been replaced by multicasts. Multicasting means 
sending a packet to the address of nodes within a multicast group. It decreases network 
bandwidth consumption since the sender only creates a single packet, which is sent to 
multiple recipients (Frankel et al., 2010). For example, if a switch receives a packet that has 
a multicast destination address. It creates copies of the packet and transmits them to the 
relevant ports (Cisco, 2010). Only hosts within the multicast group that need the packet 
receive a copy of it (Frankel et al., 2010).  
 
IPv6 Link-local Multicast Address Description 
ff02::1 All nodes multicast address 
ff02::2 All routers multicast address 
Table 2-1: Examples of link-local multicast addresses used in IPv6 (Pilihanto, 2011). 
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Table 2-1 shows examples of IPv6 link-local multicast addresses. If an IPv6 node on the 
local network wants to send a message to all the routers, it can use the multicast IPv6 
address, ff02::2. Similarly, if an IPv6 node wants to communicate with all the nodes within 
the local network, it can send the message to the multicast IPv6 address, ff02::1. 
 
Since IPv6 networks rely on multicast addresses, attackers can utilise them to cause 
flooding attacks (Wadhwa & Kumar, 2011). Attackers may also program Internet worms to 
use IPv6 multicast addresses (Raghavan & Dawson, 2011).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-4: An attacker can ping all the nodes by using ff02::1 (Weber, 2013). 
 
Figure 2-4 illustrates how an attacker can misuse the all-nodes multicast address, ff02::1. All 
nodes join the multicast group address ff02::1. It represents all link-local IPv6 enabled 
devices. Thus, sending a ping packet to the multicast group address can disclose which 
devices are present on the network (Dawood, 2012). 
 
Next individual devices can be scanned using tools like Network Mapper (Nmap). Attackers 
can also find other details such as open ports on the device. One of the network hosts can 
then be compromised. Thus, multicasts can help attackers find out which hosts exist in order 
to initiate attacks (Barker, 2013). Attackers can utilise multicasts to increase the network 
traffic to launch a DoS attack. For example, if an attacker spoofs the source address of a 
packet to that of a legitimate node, all nodes within the multicast group will respond to the 
spoofed address (Dawood, 2012). 
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2.4.2 Neighbour Discovery Protocol DoS Attacks  
 
The Neighbour Discovery Protocol (NDP) was introduced in IPv6 (Frankel et al., 2010). NDP 
processes work by using the Internet Control Message Protocol for IPv6 (ICMPv6) 
(Barbhuiya, Biswas & Nandi, 2011). ICMPv6 is a signalling and control protocol. It supports 
management and control functions. ICMPv6 provides informational and error messages 
(Raghavan & Dawson, 2011).  
 
Process(s) Informational ICMPv6 Message(s) 
Router Discovery (RD) and Stateless  
Address Auto-configuration (SLAAC) 
ICMPv6 Type 133 - Router Solicitation  
ICMPv6 Type 134 - Router Advertisement  
Address Resolution and Duplicate  
Address Detection (DAD) 
ICMPv6 Type 135 - Neighbour Solicitation  
ICMPv6 Type 136 - Neighbour Advertisement  
Router Redirect ICMPv6 Type 137 - Router Redirect 
Table 2-2: NDP processes use informational ICMPv6 messages (Frankel et al., 2010). 
 
Table 2-2 shows NDP processes and the ICMPv6 messages that they use. There are certain 
ICMPv6 messages that need to be exchanged between networks, however ICMPv6 
messages used by NDP are only required within the local network segment (Frankel et al., 
2010).  
 
A flooding-based NDP DoS attack can be launched by any Internet node. The attack can 
generate an exceptional rate of link-layer multicast traffic in the victim subnet. Such attacks 
are probably the worst bandwidth threats in IPv6 networks (Castelluccia & Mutaf, 2005). The 
following sections describe some flooding-based NDP DoS attacks. 
 
2.4.2.1 Router Advertisement Flood Attack 
 
The NDP Stateless Address Auto-configuration process utilises certain ICMPv6 messages to 
generate IPv6 addresses on the local network segment. The ICMPv6 messages used by the 
SLAAC process are Router Solicitations and Router Advertisements as shown in Table 2-2. 
The host of an IPv6 network can automatically generate an IPv6 address for itself. Section 
3.1 contains more details on the SLAAC process. 
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For communication between LANs, nodes require global IPv6 addresses (Liu, Duan, Lin, Li 
& Wu, 2009). To generate global IPv6 addresses, hosts need information from the 
intermediate router. Thus, the network administrator needs to configure the router to enable 
hosts to generate global IPv6 addresses for themselves.  
 
 
Figure 2-5: Messages exchanged during the SLAAC process (Frankel et al., 2010). 
 
Figure 2-5 shows an example of how Router Solicitations and Router Advertisements are 
exchanged during the SLAAC process. To generate a global IPv6 address, the router and 
hosts use ICMPv6 messages and multicasting. Once a router is configured, it joins the 
multicast group ff02::2 (Barker, 2013).  
 
Then, if a host sends a Router Solicitation to the all-routers multicast address ff02::2. The 
immediate router responds by sending a Router Advertisement to the multicast address, 
ff02::1. Router Advertisements are sent to all active link-local IPv6 addresses (Pilihanto, 
2011). A Router Advertisement contains information about the default router and information 
required by the host to generate an IPv6 address (Barker, 2013).  
 
There are no authentication mechanisms in place for the Router Discovery and SLAAC 
processes discussed above (Kaur & Sharma, 2014). Any node within the network can claim 
to be the default router (Liu et al., 2009). Thus, an attacker can enable the client to use a 
malicious host’s link-local IPv6 address as the address of the default router (Barker, 2013).  
 
An attacker can launch a DoS attack known as Router Advertisement (RA) flood attack by 
transmitting masses of malicious Router Advertisements on the local network segment to 
overwrite legitimate routing entries on a host’s interface (Sharma, 2010). RA Flood attacks 
will be discussed in Section 3.2. 
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2.4.2.2 Duplicate Address Detection DoS Attack 
 
The NDP Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) process utilises ICMPv6 to detect duplicate 
link-local addresses on the subnet of the local network (Pilihanto, 2011). The ICMPv6 
messages used by the DAD process are Neighbour Solicitations and Neighbour 
Advertisements as shown in Table 2-2. 
 
After the host automatically generates a global IPv6 address using the SLAAC process 
discussed in the previous section, the DAD process occurs. The DAD process enables a 
host to check if the IPv6 address it intends to assign to its interface is already being used by 
another host on the local network segment. If the address is already being used, the host will 
be notified so that it can create another address for its interface (Barker, 2013).  
 
 
Figure 2-6: Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) DoS attack (Weber, 2013). 
 
Figure 2-6 shows how a DAD DoS attack can occur. When a host enquires if the address is 
in use, any device can respond, not just the one that is using the IPv6 address. Therefore, 
attackers can launch a DoS attack that stops any new IPv6 host from joining the local 
network segment (Carter, 2007).  
 
During the DAD process, when the host sends a Neighbour Solicitation to find out if the 
address is already in use, the attacker responds by sending a fake Neighbour Advertisement 
to inform the host that the address is already in use. The host creates another address and 
the attacker claims that it is using that address too.  
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Since the attacker does not allow the new IPv6 host to use any of the IPv6 addresses it 
generates, the host gives up and is unable to join the network. It can only join the network if 
the attack is stopped (Alangar & Swaminathan, 2013). Such attacks do not need 
communication with routers. Consequently, they cannot be prevented via router 
configuration or router filtering strategies (Raghavan & Dawson, 2011). 
 
2.4.2.3 Neighbour Solicitation and Neighbour Advertisement DoS Attacks 
 
The NDP Address Resolution process utilises ICMPv6 Neighbour Solicitation and ICMPv6 
Neighbour Advertisement messages to find active link-local addresses on the subnet of the 
local network (Pilihanto, 2011).  
 
 
Figure 2-7: Messages exchanged during the Address Resolution process (Pilihanto, 2011). 
 
Figure 2-7 shows how a Neighbour Solicitation (NS) and Neighbour Advertisement (NA) are 
used to initiate communication among hosts. To communicate with another node on the local 
link, a node needs to know the MAC address of the destination node.  
 
For example, if a node wants to send a packet to ‘localhost.com’, a DNS query determines if 
the node that needs to be reached is on the local link or not. If it is not on the local link, it has 
to be reached via the default router. The default router is used to route the packet to the 
destination node since the source node knows the MAC address of the default router 
(Barbhuiya et al., 2011). 
 
If the destination address is on the local link, the source node checks its neighbour cache 
(identical to the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache used in IPv4). If the MAC address 
is not in the neighbour cache, the source node sends a Neighbour Solicitation to the 
destination host requesting its MAC address. The Neighbour Solicitation contains the MAC 
 
18 
 
 
address of the source node. The destination node sends its MAC address to the source 
node in a Neighbour Advertisement. This is a unicast message, which means it is not sent to 
any other node (Barbhuiya et al., 2011). 
 
Once the source node receives the MAC address in the Neighbour Advertisement, it updates 
its neighbour cache. It does not verify if the Neighbour Advertisement is actually from the 
destination node (Barbhuiya et al., 2011). 
 
A malicious node can cause packets for legitimate hosts and routers to be sent to an 
incorrect link-layer address. To achieve this, an attacker can send a Neighbour Solicitation 
or a Neighbour Advertisement with a spoofed MAC address of the victim node (Beck et al., 
2007). Since the IPv6 and MAC pair information, sent in a Neighbour Solicitation and 
Neighbour Advertisement are not verified, an attacker can spoof them with an incorrect IPv6 
and MAC pair. The attacker can use this spoofing technique to launch a DoS attack by 
specifying a MAC address that has not been used (Bansal, Kumar, Nandi, & Biswas, 2012) 
 
If a node’s MAC address is changed, it can send unsolicited Neighbour Advertisements at 
random intervals to advertise the address to other nodes (Hassan et al., 2014). Thus, an 
attacker can launch a DoS attack on the local network by sending masses of random 
Neighbour Advertisements (Hauser, 2014). 
 
2.4.2.4 Router Redirect DoS Attack 
 
The NDP Router Redirect process utilises ICMPv6 Router Redirect messages (Redirects) to 
redirect packets (Pilihanto, 2011). A Redirect is sent by a router to inform the host that a 
better path is available from the source to the destination. Redirects can also inform the 
source host that the destination is within the local link (Liu et al., 2009). Routers are the only 
nodes that can send Redirects, which are then passed on to the original hosts (Hassan et 
al., 2014). 
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Figure 2-8: Example of how a Redirect message can be used (Weber, 2013). 
 
Figure 2-8 shows an example in which the host sends a message to the Specific Network. 
The message reaches Router 1, which is the default router. Router 1 sends a Redirect 
message to the host to inform it about a better path (Router 2). Then the host sends 
messages to Router 2 instead of Router 1 if Specific Network needs to be the destination of 
the messages. 
 
Packets can be redirected to any lPv6 address on the link (Liu et al., 2009). A Redirect DoS 
attack can occur if an attacker redirects packets to the victim and the packets are dropped or 
forwarded to another host on the link. This attack can be malicious or caused by an error in 
the host’s configuration (Beck et al., 2007).  
 
Redirects can improve network efficiency however; network administrators must consider the 
security risks of allowing Redirects (Davies & Mohacsi, 2007). Only Router Solicitations, 
Router Advertisements, Neighbour Solicitations and Neighbour Advertisements (discussed 
in the previous sections) are mandatory and must not be dropped. These messages are 
necessary for communication to take place within the IPv6 network. Redirects are 
exceptions since they can be security threats. Network administrators need to decide if 
firewalls, routers and other nodes should accept Redirects (Davies & Mohacsi, 2007). 
 
 
20 
 
 
2.4.2.5 Defence Mechanisms against NDP DoS Attacks 
 
Attackers can easily exploit many security vulnerabilities found in NDP (Bansal et al., 2012). 
A small number of defences against NDP DoS attacks are available at present. Researchers 
are still trying to develop new ones (Hassan et al., 2014). Some mechanisms for monitoring 
or securing NDP are as follows: 
 
 Neighbour Discovery Protocol Monitor (NDPMon) can be used to monitor the network 
against NDP DoS attacks (Beck et al., 2007). Other monitoring techniques can also 
be used such as Router Advert Monitoring Daemon (RAMOND) and Rafixed. 
However, they will not be able to detect all types of DoS attacks (Gont, 2014).  
 
 An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) may be used. For example, Snort IDS can track 
NDP messages. It can send an alert when new hosts or routers are discovered. 
Snort IDS has an IPv6 plug-in that can detect flooding-based attacks (Schutte et al., 
2012).  
 
 Access Control Lists may be used in switches to prevent Router Advertisement flood 
attacks, which were discussed in Section 2.4.2.1 (Gont, 2013). 
 
 There are certain ICMPv6 messages that need to be exchanged between networks, 
however ICMPv6 messages used by NDP are only required within the local network 
segment and should never be routed. If such ICMPv6 messages are attempting to be 
transmitted outside the local link, they need to be dropped by the firewall. Preventing 
NDP ICMPv6 messages from entering or leaving the local network segment will 
ensure that attackers do not utilise them for NDP DoS attacks (Frankel et al., 2010). 
 
 Cryptographic authentication often uses verification methods that require complicated 
computations (Raghavan & Dawson, 2011). Cryptographic security mechanisms 
have not been widely used for NDP security. It remains to be seen whether they will 
gain acceptance in future (Frankel et al., 2010). 
 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter provided a discussion on how DoS attacks can occur and how they can be 
classified. Then link-local DoS attacks were covered followed by a discussion on the new 
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features introduced in IPv6, which can be exploited such as the Neighbour Discovery 
Protocol (NDP), dependence on multicast addresses and ICMPv6 messages. Details were 
given on some types of NDP DoS attacks. The chapter concluded with a brief discussion on 
monitoring and securing mechanisms that may be used against NDP DoS attacks. The next 
chapter explains Router Advertisement flood attacks and defence mechanisms that may be 
used against them. 
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Chapter 3 
 
ICMPv6 Router Advertisement Flood Attacks 
 
This chapter covers ICMPv6 Router Advertisement flood attacks. Section 3.1 describes the 
Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) process, which uses Router Advertisements. 
Section 3.2 provides details on how Router Advertisement flood attacks can occur. Section 
3.3 covers Router Advertisement flood attacks that misuse the fragment and destination 
options extension headers. Section 3.4 includes a discussion on tools that can be used to 
study the impacts of Router Advertisement flood attacks. Finally, Section 3.5 covers various 
categories of defence mechanisms that may be used against Router Advertisement flood 
attacks. 
 
3.1 IPv6 Router Discovery and Stateless Address Autoconfiguration 
 
Hosts create link-local IPv6 addresses for themselves so that they can communicate with 
other hosts within the LAN. The address cannot be used outside the LAN (Liu et al., 2009). If 
the node needs to communicate with nodes in other LANs, it needs to use a global IPv6 
address. 
 
 
Figure 3-1: Examples of two global IPv6 addresses followed by a link-local IPv6 address. 
 
Figure 3-1 shows two global IPv6 addresses and a link-local IPv6 address configured on 
Debian 7.5.0. Global IPv6 addresses are either static or dynamic. Figure 3.1 shows dynamic 
global IPv6 addresses. Static addresses are assigned manually whereas the default router 
or DHCPv6 server is used to configure a dynamic IPv6 address (Liu et al., 2009).  
 
If a DHCPv6 server is not present in the network, the network administrator can configure a 
router to provide information needed by hosts to assign global IPv6 addresses to 
themselves. This process is known as Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC). It was 
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introduced in Section 2.4.2.1. Without DHCPv6 or SLAAC, IPv6 hosts can only configure 
link-local addresses to themselves (Barker, 2013).  
 
When a router is configured in an IPv6 network, it joins the all-routers multicast group. The 
address of the group is ff02::2 (Barker, 2013). Multicast addresses were discussed in 
Section 2.4.1.  
 
Message Sent by Source Address Destination Addresses 
ICMPv6 Type 133 
Router Solicitation 
 
Host 
 
Unspecified address ff02::2  
Link-local address ff02::2 
ICMPv6 Type 134 
Router Advertisement 
 
 
Router 
 
Router’s address 
ff02::1 (if the host’s source 
address is unspecified) 
Router’s address 
Link-local address (if  
source address of the  
host is the link-local  
address) 
Table 3-1: Addresses that Router Solicitations and Router Advertisements use.  
 
Table 3-1 shows the network nodes that send Router Solicitations and Router 
Advertisements and the addresses that the messages use. According to Barbhuiya et al. 
(2011), the router sends unsolicited Router Advertisements at 200-second intervals by 
default to provide parameters that hosts need to join the network. 
 
When a host boots up in an IPv6 network, it tries to find out which network it is connected to, 
if it cannot find a manually assigned IPv6 address. However, the host does not have to wait 
200 seconds for an unsolicited Router Advertisement to join the network. It can send a 
Router Solicitation to the router. The source address in the Router Solicitation is either 
unspecified or the host’s link-local IPv6 address. The destination address of the Router 
Solicitation is the all-routers multicast address ff02::2 (Barbhuiya et al., 2011).  
 
An IPv6 router on the local-link responds to a Router Solicitation by sending a Router 
Advertisement to the host. The source address of a Router Advertisement is the address of 
the router’s interface while the destination address is the all-nodes multicast address 
(ff02::1) which is received by all routers and hosts within the local network segment 
(Barbhuiya et al., 2011).  
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Figure 3-2: Router Advertisements are sent to the all-nodes multicast address. 
 
Figure 3-2 shows a Wireshark screenshot of a Router Advertisement. The router sends a 
Router Advertisement to the address of the all-nodes multicast group (ff02::1), if the source 
address of the Router Solicitation is not specified.  
 
If a Router Solicitation contains the source address, which is the host’s link-local address, 
the router sends a Router Advertisement to that address (Grob & Hoffmann, 2012). The 
information contained in a Router Advertisement includes the prefix and address of the 
default router (address of the router from which the Router Advertisement was sent) (Chown 
& Venaas, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 3-3: Router Advertisement sent in response to a Router Solicitation (Odom, 2007). 
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Figure 3-3 shows the Router Advertisement sent by the router in response to a Router 
Solicitation sent by the host. After receiving the Router Advertisement, the host adds the 
prefix contained in the Router Advertisement to its MAC address in order to generate a 
global IPv6 address and configures its routing table (Kouns & Minoli, 2008).  
 
SLAAC is a simple process and reduces the overhead for network administrators. They do 
not need to set up any servers to assign IPv6 addresses to hosts. However, the process can 
be misused (Alangar & Swaminathan, 2013). For example, Router Advertisement attacks 
can be launched on an IPv6 network (Chown & Venaas, 2011)  
 
3.2 Router Advertisement Flood Attacks 
 
If a business is not running IPv6, the assumption is that, the network is safe from IPv6 
attacks however; IPv6 is enabled by default on many operating systems (as discussed in 
Section 2.3.1). Therefore, an IPv4 host can configure the IPv6 address from an attacker’s 
malicious Router Advertisement. Then the attacker can launch IPv6 attacks on the network 
(Bothra and Chandar, 2012). 
 
All link-local IPv6 nodes are required to replace their existing prefixes with any new prefix 
that the router is advertising. The nodes do not have the ability to differentiate between 
legitimate and malicious Router Advertisements. For this reason, if a malicious node sends 
an invalid prefix contained in the Router Advertisement, the hosts will change their legitimate 
prefixes and become compromised. Thus, computers that need to configure IPv6 addresses 
using the SLAAC process are vulnerable to spoofing and DoS attacks (Grob & Hoffmann, 
2012). 
 
The Router Advertisement flood attack is a link-local IPv6 DoS attack. It floods the local 
network segment with malicious Router Advertisements to overwrite legitimate routing 
entries on a host’s interface (Sharma, 2010).  
 
3.2.1 RA Attacks that Exploit the Fragment Extension Header 
 
Extension headers provide additional information to intermediary or destination nodes 
(Raghavan & Dawson, 2011). IPv6 uses many types of extension headers, which appear 
after the IPv6 main header and before the payload of the packet (Dawood, 2012). Examples 
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of extension headers used in IPv6 packets include fragment and destination options headers 
(Kaur & Sharma, 2014).  
 
A packet is divided into fragments (using fragment headers) if it is too large to be transmitted 
over a network. In IPv6 networks, intermediary nodes cannot perform packet fragmentation 
or reassembly. The source node fragments the packet and it is reassembled by the 
destination node (Dawood, 2012).  
 
Attackers can use fragments even if they are not needed (the packet size is normal). For 
example, a Router Advertisement needs to include many options but the packet does not 
need to be fragmented. Rather than fragmenting a large Router Advertisement, several 
Router Advertisements are used (Gont, 2013). 
 
If an attacker uses masses of forged fragmented packets and ensures that, at least one of 
the fragments is missing. The fragments received will overload fragment reassembly buffers 
at the victim node so it will not be able to reconstruct the original packet (Gont, 2014). 
 
3.2.1.1 Using Fragment Extension Headers to Bypass Security Devices  
 
Extension headers form a chained list. Each one of the Extension Headers contains the Next 
Header field in addition to the data. The Next Header value specifies the type of header, 
which immediately follows the IPv6 header (Gont, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 3-4: Extension header chaining (Shutte, 2014). 
 
27 
 
 
Figure 3-4 shows how extension headers are chained. IPv6 permits the use of any number 
of extension headers in a packet. This includes many instances of the same type of 
extension headers. Consequently, this can create issues for security devices such as 
Intrusion Detection Systems and firewalls (Alangar & Swaminathan, 2013).  
 
Several extension headers in an IPv6 packet usually extend the payload into a second 
fragment of the packet. These fragments bypass security devices, which only check the 
initial fragment of the packet (Dawood, 2012).  
 
If the first fragment of a packet contains a large number of options, the Upper Layer Protocol 
(ULP) belongs to another fragment instead of the first one and a network security device that 
only looks for the ULP in the first fragment of the packet fails to detect it (Alangar & 
Swaminathan, 2013).  
 
 
Figure 3-5: The ULP is in the second fragment instead of the first one (Small, 2013). 
 
Figure 3-5 shows how attackers can use fragmented packets to bypass security devices that 
only look for the ULP in the first fragment of the packet. As shown, the ULP is in the second 
fragment instead of the first one (Small, 2013). Thus, an attacker can send numerous 
fragments that evade network security devices to cause a DoS attack (Durdagi & Buldu, 
2010).  
 
3.2.1.2 RA Attack that hides the Contents of an IPv6 Packet 
 
This section describes a type of Router Advertisement flood attack that utilises the fragment 
and destination options extension headers to hide the contents of an IPv6 packet. Fragment 
extension headers were explained in Section 3.2.1. According to Weber (2013), a 
destination options header contains supplementary information, which is only inspected by 
the destination node. 
 
Initial Fragment 
Second Fragment, ULP 
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Figure 3-6: The attack packet before and after it was fragmented (Pivarník & Grégr, 2013). 
 
Figure 3.6 shows the original attack packet before and after it was divided into fragments. 
During this attack, the two fragments are sent individually. After the main IPv6 header, 
fragment information is contained in an extension header (Durdagi & Buldu, 2010). An 
attacker can introduce supplementary extension headers, which can come before the 
ICMPv6 message (Gont, 2014). In this case, the supplementary header is the destination 
options header. 
 
The destination options header is present in the first fragment instead of the second. Thus, 
any device that only looks at the second fragment will not be able to find the ICMPv6 header 
within the fragment because the device only looks for a value of ‘58’ in the fragment to detect 
an ICMPv6 packet (Gont, 2014). 
 
In this attack, the only way a security device can identify that the original packet was an 
ICMPv6 packet before it was fragmented is by implementing IPv6 fragment reassembly. By 
looking at the first fragment, the security device will be able to determine that the packet the 
fragment was formed from was a type of ICMPv6 message since the first fragment in which 
the destination options header’s ‘Next Header’ field is ‘58’ (Gont, 2014).  
 
3.2.1.3 RA Attack that hides the Type and Contents of an IPv6 Packet 
 
This section describes a type of Router Advertisement flood attack that utilises the fragment 
and destination options headers to hide the type and contents of an IPv6 packet. 
Fragment 1 
 
Original  
Packet 
Second  
Fragment 
First  
Fragment 
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Figure 3-7: The attack packet before and after it was fragmented (Pivarník & Grégr, 2013). 
 
Figure 3.7 shows the original attack packet before and after it was divided into fragments. 
The two fragments are sent individually during the attack. As mentioned earlier, a security 
device that only looks for a value of ‘58’ cannot determine that the fragments were created 
from an ICMPv6 packet. Since the first fragment has the “Next Header” field value of ‘60’, it 
indicates that the next extension header is the destination options header. Therefore, a 
device that only inspects the first fragment will not be able to detect that the fragment 
belongs to an ICMPv6 message (Gont, 2014). 
 
3.3 RA Flood Attack Tools 
 
The following sections discuss THC-IPv6 toolkit, SI6 Networks' IPv6 toolkit and Scapy, which 
may be used to examine the impacts of RA flood attacks. 
 
3.3.1 The Hacker’s Choice IPv6 Toolkit (THC-IPv6) 
 
The Hacker’s Choice IPv6 toolkit (THC-IPv6) was developed by Marc Heuse. To use most of 
the tools, the user only needs to specify the network interface, which will be used to launch 
the attacks (Alangar & Swaminathan, 2013). The toolkit contains attack or fuzzing tools 
(Small, 2013). RA flood attacks may be launched using either flood_router6 or 
flood_router26. The flood_router 26 tool provides more options compared to flood_router6. 
Original Packet: 
Second Fragment: 
First Fragment: 
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Attacks launched using flood_router6 are not as devastating as those launched using 
flood_router26 (Hauser, 2014). RA flood attacks that can be launched using flood_router26 
will be discussed in Section 5.2.6. 
 
3.3.2 SI6 Networks' IPv6 Toolkit  
 
Fernando Gont developed the SI6 Networks' IPv6 toolkit. The tools are more difficult to use 
compared to those available in the THC-IPv6 toolkit (Alangar & Swaminathan, 2013). SI6 
networks IPv6 toolkit is meant for fuzzing or hardening (Small, 2013). RA flood attacks can 
be launched using a tool called ra6, which provides various options (SI6 Networks, 2013). 
 
3.3.3 Scapy 
 
Philippe Biondi’s Scapy is a tool that can be used to create IPv6 packets (Alangar & 
Swaminathan, 2013). The user can specify each header and the payload of a packet 
(Barker, 2013). To use SI6 Networks' IPv6-toolkit and Scapy, the user needs to be an 
expert. However, these tools give users complete control of the types of packets they wish to 
send (Heuse, 2013). 
 
3.4 Categories of Defences against RA Flood Attacks 
 
The defence mechanisms against RA flood attacks can be classified into filtering, 
authentication and monitoring mechanisms among others.  
 
3.4.1 Filtering  
 
Defence mechanisms that work by filtering traffic include Firewall, Router Advertisement 
Guard (RA Guard) Access Control Lists (ACLs) and Validation of Source MAC addresses. 
 
3.4.1.1 Firewall 
 
A firewall prevents network intrusion by analysing incoming and outgoing packets (Tomar & 
Tyagi, 2014). It tries to protect the network from attacks that originate from other networks 
such as the Internet (Alangar & Swaminathan, 2013). Messages that are likely to be security 
risks are dropped (Davies & Mohacsi, 2007). However, attacks that use multiple extension 
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headers can easily bypass firewalls. To prevent such attacks, firewalls need to perform deep 
packet inspection (DPI). DPI can degrade the network performance and may not be effective 
against flooding-based DoS attacks (Alangar & Swaminathan, 2013). 
 
3.4.1.2 Router Advertisement Guard (RA Guard) 
 
A managed switch that has the RA Guard feature enabled can drop Router Advertisements 
from incorrect sources (Chown & Venaas, 2011). RA Guard immediately drops incoming 
Router Advertisements on the port if the device connected to it is not a router. Thus, it can 
prevent malicious hosts from launching DoS attacks. RA Guard is the best defence against 
RA attacks however some implementations of RA Guard can be circumvented using 
extension headers and fragmentation (Gont, 2014). Furthermore, RA Guard is only available 
on managed switches and cannot be implemented in environments where such switches are 
not present (Chown & Venaas, 2011). 
 
3.4.1.3 Access Control Lists (ACLs) 
 
Access Control List (ACL) is the most popular mitigation technique against IPv6 attacks, in 
spite of its operational and functional limitations (Anstee et al., 2012). ACLs configured on a 
router can ensure that NDP ICMPv6 messages such as Router Advertisements are not 
permitted if they arrive in the local link from the Internet or other networks (Frankel et al., 
2010). NDP ICMPv6 messages were discussed in Section 2.4.2. 
 
ACLs can be configured on a switch to drop incoming malicious Router Advertisements on 
ports to which end-user computers are connected since only router ports need to transmit 
Router Advertisements. Such ACLs can be called port-based ACLs (Frankel et al., 2010). 
ACLs are not available on all managed switches (Chown & Venaas, 2011). 
 
ACL configuration can contain certain keywords to block unusual attack packets. For 
example, Cisco IOS software supports the ACL ‘undetermined-transport’ keyword. When this 
keyword is used with a deny statement, the ACL drops a packet if it cannot determine the 
packet’s ULP (Sharma, 2010). ULP was discussed in Section 3.2.1.1. 
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Cisco IOS ACL also supports the ‘fragments’ keyword for protection from attacks that utilise 
non-initial fragments. When this option is used with a deny statement, the ACL drops all non-
initial fragments which need to access the switch (Cisco, 2008). 
 
3.4.1.4 Validation of Source MAC Addresses  
 
Some managed switches can be configured to check the source MAC addresses of NDP 
packets such as Router Advertisements against their corresponding source IPv6 addresses. 
If the ‘Validate Source MAC’ option is used, the switch drops NDP packets if the source IPv6 
addresses and MAC addresses do not match. The switch can check individual ports or entire 
VLANs depending on the configuration (Cisco, 2014a). This method can be used against RA 
flood attacks since the attacks use spoofed addresses. 
 
3.4.2 Authentication 
 
Authentication mechanisms that may be used against RA attacks include Secure Neighbour 
Discovery (SEND) and IEEE 802.1x. 
 
3.4.2.1 Secure Neighbour Discovery (SEND)  
 
The Secure Neighbour Discovery (SEND) protocol offers security for NDP messages such 
as Router Advertisements (Alangar & Swaminathan, 2013). SEND ensures that the sender 
of an NDP message actually owns the address it claims to have. It uses Cryptographically 
Generated Addresses (CGAs) for encryption of NDP messages and for verification of 
senders’ addresses (Beck, et al., 2007). Therefore, CGAs can prevent address spoofing and 
DoS attacks (Frankel et al., 2010).  
 
SEND packets usually contain more information than normal NDP packets such as CGA. 
For this reason, they are quite large and need to be fragmented. Thus, SEND is vulnerable 
to fragmentation-based attacks (Gont, 2013). While SEND is supposed to prevent DoS 
attacks, the protocol itself is prone to some of them (Hassan et al., 2014). Moreover, for 
campus networks, wireless conference or public networks SEND can be a very complicated 
solution. 
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3.4.2.2 IEEE 802.1x 
 
IEEE 802.1x is a standard which provides port-based security. It can help prevent DoS 
attacks. It uses authentication procedures to ensure that only legitimate nodes gain access 
to the network (Durdagi & Buldu, 2010). IEEE 802.1x requires devices to be authenticated 
using an authentication server prior to having the ability to send or receive any IPv6 traffic on 
the network (Chown & Venaas, 2011).  
 
However, a malicious node if undetected has the potential to direct IEEE 802.1x 
authentication procedures to a compromised node. This may happen since the node can 
pretend to be the authentication server. Therefore, it can gather legitimate credentials 
(Durdagi & Buldu, 2010). Another problem is that mutual authentication using IEEE 802.1x is 
likely to be as process intensive as SEND which was discussed in the previous section 
(Chown & Venaas, 2011). 
 
3.4.3 Monitoring Network Traffic 
 
Network monitoring tools such as Neighbour Discovery Protocol Monitor (NDPMon), 
RAMOND (Router Advert Monitoring Daemon) and Rafixd can monitor network traffic to 
detect link-local traffic anomalies for instance, malicious Router Advertisements. The tools 
can check if their database information matches the information contained in the packets 
(Gont, 2013). However, extension headers can be used to evade NDPMon, RAMOND and 
Rafixd (Gont, 2014). 
 
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) can be an application or hardware that uses a sniffing 
mechanism to detect malicious activities (Bul’ajoul, James & Pannu, 2013). The IDS usually 
triggers an alert when it detects any anomalies in network traffic (Pilihanto, 2011). Snort is a 
commonly used application IDS. By default, Snort rules cannot detect patterns in 
connectionless protocols such as NDP’s ICMPv6 messages such as Router Advertisements. 
Therefore, Schutte et al. (2012) developed an IPv6 plugin for Snort IDS, which can monitor 
the network to detect RA attacks (Schutte et al., 2012). 
 
3.4.4 Other Methods 
 
DHCPv6, Partitioning and Manual Configuration are other methods that may be used to 
prevent RA flood attacks. 
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3.4.4.1 Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol version 6 (DHCPv6) 
 
Network administrators can configure hosts to use DHCPv6 instead of SLAAC. They can 
add the default gateway and prefix options for DHCPv6. A malicious Router Advertisement 
sent to a multicast address can enable all the hosts, which depend on the SLAAC process to 
be compromised. Using DHCPv6 is beneficial in that it provides different answers for 
different hosts. If an error occurs, the only hosts affected will be those, which refreshed their 
DHCP information since that point in time.  
 
Even though the DHCPv6 server can be used instead of SLAAC, it is not exactly a better 
solution since DHCPv6 has some limitations, for example instead of malicious Router 
Advertisements, the problem shifts to malicious DHCPv6 servers (Chown & Venaas, 2011). 
DHCPv6 is also susceptible to other attacks and researchers are still working on improving 
DHCPv6 security (Sharma, 2010). 
 
3.4.4.2 Partitioning 
 
If users or systems within a network are separated, the damage caused by malicious traffic 
can be reduced. Bridging may be used in broadband networks. Any host should not be able 
to receive Router Advertisements sent by other hosts instead of the router. On the other 
hand, this would considerably increase the consumption of address space in enterprise 
networks. Usually routing to the edge requires high hardware and software licensing costs 
(Chown & Venaas, 2011). 
 
To minimise the impact of DoS attacks, VLANs (Virtual LANs) may be used. During a DoS 
attack, the affected victim(s) of the VLAN will not consume the entire bandwidth of the 
network. Thus, the attack will be restricted and the network traffic being transmitted to the 
victim VLAN may be detected before attacks are launched on other VLANs (Sen & Singha 
2013).  
 
3.4.4.3 Manual Configuration 
 
If a manually configured address is present on a host, most operating systems ignore any 
Router Advertisements that the host receives (Chown & Venaas, 2011). Static configuration 
should be used in parts of the network for example Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to prevent 
attacks (Frankel et al., 2010). Static entries need to be used for critical IPv6 systems.  
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Manual configuration is one of the best practices for preventing RA attacks. Unfortunately, it 
is also a time-consuming practice for administrators (Sharma, 2010). Static configuration can 
prevent many common NDP attacks (Alangar & Swaminathan, 2013). The Disable Router 
Discovery method can be used to prevent hosts from using Router Advertisements to assign 
IPv6 addresses to themselves (Bowne & Prince, 2013). 
 
3.5 Selection of Defence Mechanisms 
 
The following criteria were used to select defence mechanisms against RA flood attacks for 
this study: 
 
 The defence mechanism must attempt to secure the network instead of only 
monitoring it. 
 The defence mechanism should not be too difficult to implement. 
 It should be possible to implement the defence mechanism using the equipment 
provided at the computer laboratory. 
 
The defence mechanisms, which met all of the above-mentioned criteria, were Access 
Control Lists, Manual Configuration (Disable Router Discovery), RA Guard, Validation of 
Source MAC Addresses (Validate Source MAC) and Partitioning (VLAN). Section 5.3 
explains how these defence mechanisms were configured. 
 
3.6 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter covered RA flood attacks. The Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) 
process was discussed. Then details were given on how Router Advertisements used in the 
SLAAC process can be misused to overwrite legitimate routing entries on a host’s interface. 
The chapter also covered RA flood attacks that exploit IPv6 extension headers and tools that 
may be used to observe the impacts of RA flood attacks. Finally, a number of defence 
mechanisms against RA flood attacks were discussed. The next chapter includes details on 
the Methodology used for this research.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Methodology 
 
This chapter covers the hypotheses, research method, literature review process and the 
data collection process used for this study. Section 4.1 covers the hypotheses. The research 
method is specified in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 includes the DoS defence evaluation. Section 
4.4 explains how the literature review was conducted. The chapter concludes with Section 
4.5, which describes the process used to gather data for this study. The section covers the 
performance metrics, data collection tools and the process used to analyse data gathered 
from experiments. 
 
4.1 Research Hypotheses 
 
Research hypotheses are required for conducting comprehensive research. They can help 
the researcher design experiments. This research was conducted to test the hypotheses 
listed below:  
 
 The TCP RTT and CPU utilisation are likely to increase significantly on both 
Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 during the attacks. 
 
 The attacks are expected to cause TCP throughput to decrease significantly. 
 
 The attacks have the potential to deplete the resources of a switch thus the 
performance of the monitoring VLAN is likely to deteriorate while the attack is 
occurring in the victim VLAN. 
 
 ACLs will not be as effective as ACLs with ‘undetermined-transport’ and ‘fragments’ 
keywords during attacks that use extension headers. 
 
4.2 Research Methods  
 
Quantitative or qualitative methods may be used to carry out research. According to Punch 
(2013), the nature of data distinguishes quantitative and qualitative research methods. 
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Qualitative research usually involves the use of words. On the other hand, quantitative 
research refers to research in which data is expressed as numbers (Punch, 2013).  
 
The aim of this research was to evaluate the effectiveness of existing defence mechanisms 
against three types of RA flood attacks. Thus, quantitative research was required. Qualitative 
research techniques were not suitable for this research. It was not possible to obtain reliable 
results by measuring the efficacies of the defence mechanisms using unstructured data.  
 
Numerical data had to be gathered from experiments conducted at the computer laboratory 
to obtain findings. TCP throughput, TCP RTT and CPU utilisation results were gathered 
using appropriate data collection tools. Then, the results were evaluated. Neill (2007) 
mentioned that even though gathering quantitative data is time consuming, it is less likely to 
be generalised. Data gathered using quantitative methods is more reliable and can be used 
to test hypotheses effectively. 
 
4.3 DoS Defence Evaluation Methods 
 
DoS defence evaluation methods are used by researchers to demonstrate how DoS attacks 
can be reduced or eliminated when defence mechanisms are present. Such methods enable 
researchers to measure the effect of a defence mechanism on legitimate network traffic. It is 
necessary for researchers to understand the limitations of each DoS defence evaluation 
method so that they are able to select an appropriate method for their hypothesis (Mirkovic 
et al., 2009). The following sections include benefits and limitations of using three DoS 
defence evaluation methods. The testbed method was chosen to conduct this research as it 
has advantages over other methods. 
 
4.3.1 Theory 
 
Theory is an appropriate method for finding answers to questions about situations, which 
can be represented using existing models such as probabilistic models, random selection 
from a set etc. Generally, theory is not a good choice for efficiency evaluation. At present, 
tools available are not reliable enough to model the complexity of traffic mixes and their 
interaction with the essential hardware and network protocols particularly in high-stress 
attacks like DoS attacks (Mirkovic et al., 2009). 
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4.3.2 Simulation 
 
Simulation is commonly used for finding answers to network performance questions. 
However, simulation software cannot be used to produce experimental results that are as 
accurate as the results obtained using a real network such as a testbed. For example, 
forwarding devices such as switches and routers are only modelled at high levels in popular 
packet-level simulators such as ns-2. The ranges of latencies within devices and maximum 
rates at which packets are forwarded in commercial forwarding devices are not integrated 
(Mirkovic et al., 2009). 
 
4.3.3 Testbed 
 
Experiments can be conducted in a mini-network such as a testbed. A testbed provides a 
more realistic evaluation environment compared to theory and simulation. One of the 
reasons is that real operating systems, applications and real hardware are used to conduct 
experiments. Both legitimate and DoS traffic can be generated and customised in a number 
of ways.  
 
Furthermore, experiments are conducted using a defence mechanism’s prototype rather 
than abstracting the defence mechanism and simulating it or developing its theoretical 
model. Even though it is time-consuming compared to the theory and simulation methods, 
testbeds usually produce results that are reliable (Mirkovic et al., 2009). 
 
4.4 Literature Review Process 
 
The purpose of the literature review is to understand how a researcher’s work is positioned 
when compared to the works of others. It is important to find out what others have already 
discovered so that the researcher does not repeat their research.  
 
The literature review can enable a researcher to find out what works and what does not or 
which methods work better. Moreover, the researcher may find new useful procedures for 
the study. The findings from the literature review can be used to determine which areas need 
further research. In other words, research gaps need to be identified (Emerson, 2005).  
 
A literature review was conducted to examine existing research on the Router Advertisement 
flood attacks and defences against such attacks. Valid sources need to be considered to 
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gather literature on a topic. For example textbooks, manuals, technical reports, conference 
proceedings and journals among others. The Unitec library database and reputable websites 
were used to search for literature.  
 
4.5 Experimental Data Collection Process 
 
A testbed environment was deployed to conduct experiments for data collection and 
analysis. The results obtained were entered into Microsoft Excel spreadsheet so that the 
average and standard deviation values could be calculated. Microsoft Excel was also used 
to generate graphs. Chapter 6 includes the graphs and analysis of the results.  
 
4.5.1 Performance Metrics 
 
DoS attacks can be measured by observing performance metrics such as throughput, 
response time and CPU utilisation (Mirkovic, Fahmy, Reiher & Thomas, 2009). 
 
Performance Metric Data Collection Tool(s) 
TCP throughput Iperf 
TCP RTT TCPing 
CPU utilisation Resource Monitor and Saidar 
Table 4-1: Performance metrics and tools that were used to gather data. 
 
Table 4-1 lists the performance metrics and data collection tools that were used for the 
experiments. Section 5.2 includes details on the data collection tools. For each metric, the 
results were gathered before and during the RA flood attacks as well as after the defence 
mechanisms were configured.  
 
Before the results were recorded, numerous experiments had to be conducted for various 
durations to determine the optimum experiment duration for each performance metric. More 
precisely, experiments were conducted for 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 and 30-second intervals. The 
optimum experiment duration for each performance metric was determined when the results 
became consistent. This means the optimum experiment duration for each performance 
metric was determined when the standard deviation divided by the average was around 
0.07. Ultimately, the average of 10 experiments was calculated for each performance metric.  
 
40 
 
 
The optimum duration of experiments (runs), varied depending on the performance metric 
being measured. TCP throughput was gathered using 20-second runs. TCP RTT and CPU 
utilisation were gathered using 30-second intervals. The reasons for the selection of these 
experiment durations have been included in the following sections (Section 4.5.1.1, Section 
4.5.1.2 and Section 4.5.1.3). 
 
4.5.1.1 TCP Throughput 
 
TCP throughput refers to the average number of bytes received successfully by the 
destination over a link at a given time (Tabash, Ahmad & Beg, 2010). DoS attacks can be 
measured using network traffic parameters such as throughput. Throughput is significant for 
TCP-based traffic, which lowers the rate at which it is sending packets as a response to 
network congestion (Mirkovic et al., 2009). 
 
TCP throughput was measured on Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 clients using Iperf. It was 
measured in megabits per second (Mbps). As mentioned earlier, TCP throughput was tested 
for various durations before results could be recorded for analysis. 
 
 
Figure 4-1: Example of the average Iperf TCP throughput results after a 20-second run. 
 
Figure 4-1 shows an example of Iperf average TCP throughput results for one run, which 
lasted 20 seconds. The results were consistent during 20-second runs. Iperf failed to 
establish a connection when attempts were made to measure the throughput using runs that 
lasted more than 20 seconds during attacks. Thus, the duration of each run was 20 seconds 
for TCP throughput.  
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4.5.1.2 TCP Round-trip Time (RTT)  
 
Measuring round-trip time means subtracting the time at which the TCP segment is 
transmitted from the time at which the acknowledgement is received (Comer, 2006). RTT is 
important for measuring the TCP connections. A packet is believed to be lost if it exceeds its 
RTT. Hence, it is retransmitted via a TCP connection. Retransmissions always occur during 
a DoS attack (Rao, 2011). 
 
TCP RTT was measured on Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 using TCPing. It was measured 
in milliseconds. Various durations were used to find the optimum duration of each run before 
the results were recorded. 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Example of average TCPing RTT Results after a 30-second run. 
 
Figure 4-2 shows the average TCPing RTT results for one run, which lasted 30 seconds.  
The results were inconsistent when each run lasted less than 30 seconds. Thus, 30-second 
runs were used to measure the RTT. 
 
4.5.1.3 CPU Utilisation 
 
Packets transmitted during flooding-based attacks can exhaust the CPU, which can lead to 
the degradation of system performance (Saad, Almomani, Altaher, Gupta & Manickam, 
2014). CPU utilisation was measured as percentage using Resource Monitor and Saidar on 
Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 respectively.  
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Figure 4-3: CPU utilisation calculated using Resource Monitor on Windows 8.1. 
 
Figure 4-3 shows the percentage of real-time CPU utilisation calculated using Resource 
Monitor on Windows 8.1. The values were recorded for 30 seconds and then the average 
values were calculated. 
 
 
Figure 4-4: CPU utilisation calculated using Saidar on Debian 7.5.0. 
 
Figure 4-4 shows the percentage of real-time CPU utilisation using Saidar on Debian 7.5.0. 
The procedure used to gather average values on Windows 8.1 was also used for Debian 
7.5.0. The runs lasted for various durations before results could be recorded for analysis as 
mentioned earlier. Consistent results could be obtained when each run lasted 30 seconds. 
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As with TCP throughput and TCP RTT, it was important to see the impact of the attack on 
CPU utilisation at Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 before and during the attack. As a result, 
comparisons could be made when results were gathered after the defence mechanisms 
were configured.  
 
4.5.2 The Process of Evaluating Defences against RA Flood Attacks 
 
The first step in this process was to gather data before and during the attacks. This was 
carried out to compare the differences in results obtained before and during the attacks. 
Then defence mechanisms were configured and the results from experiments were 
compared to the results obtained before and after attacks. This was carried out to determine 
the efficacy of each defence mechanism. 
 
 
Figure 4-5: Example of a RA flood attack launched using the flood_router26 tool. 
 
Figure 4-5 shows an example of a RA flood attack launched using The Hacker’s Choice 
(THC) flood_router26 tool. It does not allow the user to modify the attack rate and size of 
attack packets. Three types of attacks were launched using the tool. Section 5.2.6 provides 
more details on the attacks. The defence mechanisms used were ACLs, Disable Router 
Discovery, RA Guard, Validate Source MAC and VLAN. Section 5.3 provides details on how 
these defence mechanisms were configured.  
 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
 
In this chapter, the hypotheses, research method, DoS defence evaluation method, literature 
review process and data collection process for this study were discussed. The research 
hypotheses were listed followed by a discussion on the research method. Then the literature 
review process was introduced and details on the data collection process were given. The 
performance metrics used for this study, namely TCP throughput, TCP RTT and CPU 
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utilisation were discussed followed by the process used to evaluate the performances of 
defence mechanisms against RA flood attacks. The next chapter covers the experimental 
design used for this study.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Experimental Design 
 
This chapter presents the experimental design used for this study. Section 5.1 describes the 
network testbed, which was deployed for data collection. The section also includes details on 
the hardware and software used to set up the network testbed. Section 5.2 describes the 
attack tool, the network protocol analyser and other tools used to gather data. Section 5.3 
includes details on how some defence mechanisms against Router Advertisement flood 
attacks were configured. The defence mechanisms were Access Control Lists, RA Guard, 
Disable Router Discovery, VLAN and Validate Source MAC.  
 
5.1 Network Testbed  
 
A network testbed was deployed to observe the impact of RA flood attacks. The testbed was 
similar to the ones that previous researchers have used to study RA attacks (Lad, Alghalbi, 
Ahmed & Alotaibi, 2013). 
 
 
Figure 5-1: Network testbed used to evaluate defences against RA flood attacks. 
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Figure 5-1 depicts the network testbed, which was used to gather data from experiments 
before and during RA flood attacks as well as after the defences were used. Cat5e cables 
were used to connect the network nodes. The router was required for automatic assignment 
of IPv6 addresses using the SLAAC process discussed in Section 3.1.  
 
The default IPv6 subnet size was used which is /64 (Gashinsky, Jaeggli & Kumari, 2012).  
The router did not need to connect to an external network for the experiments as the attacks 
were launched within the network. The router’s IPv6 prefix was 2001:db8:1:1a2b::/64. The 
automatically configured computers used this prefix to generate their IPv6 addresses.  
 
As shown in Figure 5-1, static and dynamic IPv6 addresses were used for the experiments. 
When the RA flood attacks were launched, all the computers that had automatically 
configured IPv6 addresses (except the attacker) lost their network connections. Therefore, 
automatically configured computers could not be used to analyse the impacts of the attacks 
on the network.  
 
Two monitoring computers were given static IPv6 addresses to test the TCP throughput and 
TCP RTT during the attacks. One computer (victim), which had an automatically configured 
IPv6 address, was used to see if the defences could prevent it from losing its network 
connection during attacks. 
 
The testbed had two monitoring computers, one attack computer and one victim computer 
as shown in Figure 5-1. Windows 8 was used for monitoring and Kali Linux was used to 
launch attacks. The roles of Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 were exchanged for the 
experiments. When Windows 8.1 was the victim, Debian 7.5.0 was used for monitoring 
(Figure 5-2) and when Debian 7.5.0 was the victim, Windows 8.1 was used for monitoring 
(Figure 5-3).  
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Figure 5-2: The testbed with Windows 8.1 as the victim. 
 
Figure 5-2 shows the network testbed when Windows 8.1 was the victim. The monitoring 
computers were Debian 7.5.0 and Windows 8. The attacks were launched using Kali Linux 
1.0.6.  
 
 
Figure 5-3: The testbed with Debian 7.5.0 as the victim. 
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Figure 5-3 shows the network testbed when Debian 7.5.0 was the victim. The monitoring 
computers were Windows 8.1 and Windows 8. The attacks were launched using Kali Linux 
1.0.6 as mentioned before. 
 
The performance metrics used were TCP throughput, TCP RTT and CPU utilisation. These 
were discussed in Section 4.5.1. The tools installed on the monitoring computers were Iperf, 
TCPing, Resource Monitor, Saidar and Wireshark as shown in Table 5-1. The attack tool 
used for the experiments was THC flood_router26, which comes bundled with Kali Linux 
1.0.6. Section 5.2 provides details on how the tools were used to conduct experiments.  
 
5.1.1 Hardware Details  
 
Four computers with identical hardware components were used to set up the network 
testbed. Table 5-1 shows details on hardware used to set up the testbed environment.  
 
Hardware Details 
Computer 
Hardware 
CPU Intel® CoreTMi5 2.8 GHz 
Memory 8 GB RAM 
Hard Disk Western Digital Caviar SE 160 GB 
Network Interface Card Intel® PRO/1000 GT Adapter 
Other Network 
Devices 
Network patch cables Digitus UTP Cat5e 
Switch  Cisco SG 300-10 1.3.5 
Switch Cisco 3560G PoE-28 12.2(58)SE2 
Router Cisco 2811 12.4(24)T 
Table 5-1: Details on hardware used to set up the network testbed. 
 
Table 5-1 provides details on hardware used to set up the testbed environment. A router, 
switch, four computers and some cables were used to set up the testbed as discussed 
earlier. Either of the two Gigabit switches was used depending on experiment requirements. 
The Cisco 3560G switch was used for all of the experiments except the ones, which required 
the RA Guard and Validate Source MAC defences. These defences were not available on 
Cisco 3560G.  
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Cisco 300-10 could not be used for all the experiments since it did not support switch-based 
IPv6 ACLs, which were also required for the experiments. These ACLs were only available 
on Cisco 3560G. Section 5.4 provides details on how RA Guard, Validate Source MAC and 
ACLs were configured.  
 
5.1.2 Software Details 
 
Four operating systems were used in this study. Various tools had to be installed on each 
operating system.  
 
Operating System Role Tools 
Microsoft 
Windows 
Windows 8.1 
Monitoring /Victim 
computer 
Iperf, Wireshark and 
Resource Monitor 
Windows 8 Monitoring computer Iperf and TCPing 
Linux 
Distributions 
Debian 7.5.0 
Monitoring /Victim 
computer 
Iperf, Saidar and  
Wireshark 
Kali Linux 1.0.6 Attack computer THC flood_router26 
Table 5-2: Details on software required for the experiments. 
 
Table 5-2 shows the operating systems and the tools that were installed on each of them. 
Iperf and TCPing were used to measure TCP throughput and TCP RTT respectively. 
Wireshark was used to analyse the network protocols. Resource Monitor and Saidar were 
used to monitor CPU utilisation on Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 respectively. THC 
flood_router 26 was used to launch attacks. Section 5.2 includes details on these tools. 
 
5.2 Tools used for Conducting Experiments 
 
The tools were selected based on the following criteria: 
 
 The tool needs to provide support for IPv6. 
 The tool should support Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0. 
 The tool should attempt to work during RA flood attacks. 
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Various tools were considered such as IPTraf, D-ITG, Netperf, etc. It was difficult to select 
tools to conduct experiments, as most of the tools only met one of the aforementioned 
criteria. For example, IPTraf did not provide IPv6 support; D-ITG provided IPv6 support but 
not for Windows 8.1. Netperf provided support for IPv6 and Windows 8.1. However, it did not 
suffere from connection issues when the attacks were launched. The tools that met all of the 
above-mentioned criteria were Iperf and TCPing. 
 
5.2.1 Iperf  
 
Iperf measures TCP or UDP bandwidth. By default, Iperf uses port 5001 and 10-second 
tests. It finds the maximum amount of data that can be transmitted between two computers 
for a given time. Iperf needs to be installed on two computers, one of them can be the Iperf 
client and the other can be the Iperf server (Iperf, 2014).  
 
In this study, Iperf was installed on Windows 8, Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 (monitoring 
computers to measure TCP throughput. Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 were the Iperf 
servers. They shared the Windows 8 Iperf client. Thus, TCP throughput was measured 
between Windows 8.1 and Windows 8. Then it was measured between Debian 7.5.0 and 
Windows 8. 
 
5.2.2 TCPing  
 
TCPing is a small console application that works like the ‘ping’ utility. To measure the RTT 
between computers, ping uses the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) whereas 
TCPing uses a TCP connection. TCP uses port 80 and 4-second tests by default (Ping over 
a TCP Connection, 2013). 
 
In this study, TCPing measured TCP RTT between two monitoring computers. TCPing was 
installed on Windows 8, which connected to the Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 monitoring 
computers to measure the TCP RTT. 
 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
 
5.2.3 Wireshark 
  
Wireshark is an open-source network protocol analyser. It allows the user to capture network 
traffic on an interface. Wireshark supports many operating systems such as Windows, OS X, 
Linux and UNIX. It includes many features (Wireshark, 2014).  
 
In this study, Wireshark was installed on monitoring computers and the victim computer. It 
was mainly used when TCP throughput, TCP RTT or CPU utilisation results were not normal 
(during attacks without defences and during attacks with ineffective defences). Wireshark 
was used to observe the attack traffic transmitted to the monitoring computers and the victim 
computer.  
 
5.2.4 Resource Monitor 
 
Resource Monitor is a tool that comes bundled with Windows operating systems such as 
Windows 7, Windows 8 and Windows 8.1 (Brengle, 2013). It enables the user to observe 
CPU utilisation, hard disk, network and memory usage. In this study, Resource Monitor was 
used to monitor the CPU utilisation on Windows 8 and Windows 8.1. 
 
5.2.5 Saidar 
 
Saidar is a Linux system-monitoring tool. It is text-based and displays system statistics such 
as CPU, processes, memory etc. (Saidar, 2014). In this study, Saidar was used to measure 
CPU utilisation on Debian 7.5.0. 
 
5.2.6 The Hacker’s Choice flood_router26 
 
The Hackers Choice (THC) provides a set of tools that can enable the user to explore 
weaknesses in existing IPv6 implementations (Grob & Hoffmann, 2012). One of the tools, 
called flood_router26 can be used to flood the local link with Router Advertisements (Hauser, 
2014). The flood_router26 tool sends 17 prefixes and 17 route entries in each Router 
Advertisement (Small, 2013).  
 
To join the IPv6 network, a computer requires only one legitimate Router Advertisement 
(Chown & Venaas, 2011). The flood of packets from a flood_router26 attack prevents 
 
52 
 
 
computers from joining the IPv6 network or causes computers that have already joined the 
network using automatically configured IPv6 addresses to lose their network connections 
(Grob & Hoffmann, 2012).  
 
In this study, flood_router26 was used to examine the impact of RA flood attacks on 
Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0. When a RA flood attack was launched, the attack packets 
were sent to all nodes within the network using the all nodes multicast address, ff02::1 which 
was discussed in Section 2.4.1. As discussed in Section 5.1, the attack caused the 
automatically configured computer (victim) to lose its network connection while statically 
configured computers (monitoring computers) maintained theirs. 
 
THC flood_router26 floods the network with around 100,000 Router Advertisements per 
second. The flood_router26 tool does not allow the user to specify the attack packet rate and 
size. Nevertheless, the user can specify a number of options to modify the default attack 
packets to circumvent security devices. In this study, three types of attacks were used. 
 
Type Command Packets Length of Packets 
1 flood_router26 eth0 IPv6 Router Advertisement 1038 bytes 
2 flood_router26 –F eth0 IPv6 Router Advertisement 1046 bytes 
3 flood_router26 –D eth0 
IPv6 Router Advertisement 1302 bytes 
IPv6 Fragment 78 bytes 
IPv6 Fragment 1302 bytes 
Table 5-3:  The commands used to launch attacks, the packets and packet lengths. 
 
Table 5-3 shows the commands used to launch three types of RA flood attacks and the type 
and length of packets sent during the attacks. The user needs to specify an interface from 
which the attacks will be launched. In this study, the interface was eth0. The default 
command was used to launch the first type of attack. When the options –F or –D were 
specified, the attack packets used extension headers discussed, in Section 3.2.1. 
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Figure 5-4: Legitimate packets received before a RA flood attack. 
 
Figure 5-4 shows a Wireshark screenshot of legitimate packets including a Router 
Advertisement received before a RA flood attack. The size of a Router Advertisement should 
only be 118 bytes as shown. 
 
 
Figure 5-5: 1038-byte Router Advertisements received during an attack without an option. 
 
Figure 5-5 shows a Wireshark screenshot of Router Advertisements received during a RA 
flood attack that was launched without specifying an option (default Router Advertisement 
flood attack). As shown, the attack transmitted 1038-byte Router Advertisements. 
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Figure 5-6: 1046-byte Router Advertisements received during an attack with the –F option.  
 
Figure 5-6 shows a Wireshark screenshot of 1046-byte Router Advertisements received 
during a RA flood attack that was launched after specifying the –F option. It means the 
packets were divided into fragments before they were sent and reassembled when received. 
 
 
Figure 5-7: A Router Advertisement and fragments received during the –D option attack. 
 
Figure 5-7 shows a Wireshark screenshot of a Router Advertisement and fragments 
received during a RA flood attack that was launched after specifying the –D option. The 
attack packets used extension headers (fragment and destination options headers). 
According to Hauser (2014), each attack packet sent during this attack includes a large 
destination option header, which has to be divided into fragments before it is sent. 
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Figure 5-8: A reassembled Router Advertisement received during the –D option attack. 
 
Figure 5-8 shows a Wireshark screenshot of the details of a 1302-byte Router Advertisement 
received during a RA flood attack that was launched after specifying the –D option. The 
Router Advertisement was reassembled from three fragments. The rest of the fragments 
shown could not be reassembled. 
 
 
Figure 5-9: A fragment from a malformed packet received during the –D option attack. 
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Figure 5-9 shows a Wireshark screenshot of the details of a 1302-byte fragment received 
during a RA flood attack that was launched after specifying the –D option. The destination 
computer could not reassemble the original malformed packet as shown.  
 
5.3 Configuration of Defence Mechanisms 
 
A number of defence mechanisms may be used against RA flood attacks. They were 
discussed in Section 3.4. For the experiments, Access Control Lists (ACLs), Disable Router 
Discovery, RA Guard, Validate Source MAC and VLAN were selected as discussed in 
Section 3.5.  
 
All defences were configured on the switch except Disable Router Discovery, which had to 
be configured on the hosts. As discussed in Section 5.1.1, RA Guard and Validate Source 
MAC had to be configured on the Cisco 300-10 switch while ACLs were configured on the 
Cisco 3560G switch. 
 
5.3.1 Access Control Lists (ACLs) 
 
Three variations of the Access Control List (ACL) were configured for the experiments. The 
first ACL was configured for attacks that did not use extensions headers whereas the other 
two ACLs included the ‘fragments’ and ‘undetermined-transport’ keywords to protect the 
network from attacks with extension headers.  
 
5.3.1.1 Access Control List without options 
 
According to Small (2013), Router Advertisements should only be sent by routers. They 
should not come from hosts thus incoming Router Advertisements from host ports at the 
switch need to be dropped. If an ACL that drops Router Advertisements is applied to all ports 
except the router port, any Router Advertisement sent from a host will be dropped by the 
switch. Thus, the switch will only allow Router Advertisements that are sent by the router to 
reach the destination host.  
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Step Command Details 
1 #configure terminal Enters the global configuration mode. 
2 #ipv6 access-list host Creates an IPv6 ACL named ‘host’. 
3 #deny icmp any any router-advertisement Denies Router Advertisements. 
4 #permit ipv6 any any Permits the rest of the IPv6 traffic. 
5 
 
#interface g0/1 
 
Specifies the type and number of the 
interface. 
6 #ipv6 traffic-filter host in 
Assigns the IPv6 ACL named ‘host’ to 
the interface, Gigabit Ethernet 0/1 so 
that incoming traffic can be filtered 
as specified in the ACL. 
Table 5-4: ACL configuration that denies Router Advertisements (Small, 2013). 
 
Table 5-4 shows the commands that were used to create an ACL that was expected to drop 
Router Advertisements at the switch. When the ACL was applied, the switch was expected 
to drop any Router Advertisements it received instead of forwarding them to hosts.  
 
5.3.1.2 ACL with the Fragments Keyword 
 
The initial IPv6 packet fragments are not required to include the ULP. If the ULP is not in the 
first fragment, it appears in other fragments. Therefore, attacks can be launched that utilise 
non-initial fragments. ULP was introduced in Section 3.2.1.1. 
Legitimate Router Advertisements do not need to be fragmented thus the ULP is expected to 
be in the packet. If a Router Advertisement is sent as fragments and the initial fragment does 
not include the ULP, then the fragment is expected to belong to a malicious Router 
Advertisement. 
 
Cisco IOS supports the ‘fragments’ keyword which can be used in an ACL. It can prevent 
attacks that utilise non-initial fragments, as the option drops all non-initial fragments that do 
not include an ULP (Cisco, 2008). According to Small (2013), such malicious fragments may 
be sent to multicast addresses. Blocking ff02::1, which is the all-nodes multicast address, is 
not enough. Network nodes listen to many multicast groups. The following commands may 
be used to find a list of these multicast groups on Windows and Linux: 
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Windows:  #netsh int ipv6 show join 
Linux:  #ip -6 maddr show 
 
The network administrator needs block fragments to all multicast groups the nodes listen to. 
Fragments from the multicast addresses ff02::1, ff02::c, ff02::fb, ff02::1:3, ff02::1:ff00:0/104 
and fe80::/64 need to be blocked in most IPv6 networks. If nodes in the network listen to 
other IPv6 multicast groups, they should also be added to the list (Small, 2013).  
 
Multicast Address Details 
ff02::1 All nodes on the link (all-nodes multicast address). 
ff02::c 
Simple Service Discovery Protocol (SSDP) is used to find 
network devices and services (Labiod, 2010). 
ff02::fb 
Multicast Domain Name System (MDNS) enables operations 
similar to DNS to be performed on the local link when there are 
no DNS servers present (Cheshire &  Krochmal, 2013). 
ff02::1:3 
Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) enables name 
resolution to occur when DNS name resolution  cannot be 
used (Aboba, Thaler & Esibov, 2007). 
ff02::1:ff00:0/104 Solicited node multicast address (Small, 2013). 
fe80::/64 All link-local addresses  
Table 5-5: Details of multicast addresses that were blocked  for the experiments. 
 
Table 5-5 shows details of multicast groups that were blocked for the experiments in this 
study. The commands shown in Table 5-6 were used. 
 
Step Command(s) Details 
1 #configure terminal 
Enters the global configuration  
mode. 
2 #ipv6 access-list host Creates an IPv6 ACL named ‘host’. 
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Step Command(s) Details 
3 
#deny icmp any any router-advertisement 
#deny ipv6 any host ff02::1 fragments 
#deny ipv6 any host ff02::C fragments 
#deny ipv6 any host ff02::FB fragments 
#deny ipv6 any host ff02::1:3 fragments 
#deny ipv6 any ff02::1:ff00:0/104 fragments 
#deny ipv6 any fe80::/64 fragments 
Denies Router Advertisements 
destined to the list of multicast 
addresses specified.  
4 #permit ipv6 any any Permits the rest of the IPv6 traffic. 
5 #interface g0/1 
Specifies the type and number of  
the interface. 
6 
 
#ipv6 traffic-filter host in 
 
Assigns the IPv6 ACL named ‘host’ 
to the interface, Gigabit Ethernet 
0/1 so that incoming traffic can be 
filtered as specified in the ACL. 
Table 5-6: ACL configuration that denies fragmented Router Advertisements (Small, 2013). 
 
Table 5-6 shows the commands that were used to create an ACL which included the 
‘fragments’ keywords to block malicious  Router Advertisments. 
 
5.3.1.3 ACL with the Undetermined-transport Keyword 
 
The ‘undetermined-transport’ keyword drops initial fragments that do not have a ULP as 
discussed in Section 3.2.1.1. An IPv6 ACL, which includes the ‘undetermined-transport’, may 
be applied to all ports. This option also blocks the IPv6 routing protocol OSPFv3 (Open 
Shortest Path First version 3) so the network administrator needs to allow this if it is 
required. The undetermined-transport keyword is not available on legacy hardware (Small, 
2013). Table 5-7 shows the commands suggested by Small (2013) that were used in this 
study. 
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Step Command Details 
1 #configure terminal Enters the global configuration mode. 
2 #interface g0/1 Specifies the type and number of the interface. 
3 #ipv6 traffic-filter Host in 
Creates and applies an empty ACL named ‘host’ 
to the interface, Gigabit Ethernet 0/1.  
Assigns the IPv6 ACL named host to incoming 
traffic at the interface. 
4 #ipv6 access-list Host Creates an IPv6 ACL named ‘host’ 
5 
#deny icmp any any router- 
advertisement 
Denies Router Advertisements. 
6 
#deny ipv6 any any  
undetermined-transport 
Denies initial fragments that do not have a ULP. 
7 #permit ipv6 any any Permits the rest of the IPv6 traffic. 
Table 5-7: ACL configuration that drops initial fragments without a ULP (Small, 2013). 
 
Table 5-7 shows the commands that were used to create an ACL which included the 
undetermined-transport keyword to deny initial Router Advertisments fragments without a 
ULP. 
 
5.3.2 Disable Router Discovery 
 
The Disable Router Discovery method can be used to prevent a host from using a Router 
Advertisement to assign an IPv6 address to itself. A static IPv6 address needs to be 
configured. Then the computer will drop any Router Advertisements it receives. Router 
Discovery needs to be turned off using the ‘netsh’ command in Windows to prevent RA flood 
attacks (Bowne & Prince, 2013). 
 
Windows:  
The following command disables the acceptance of routing entries on the specified interface 
(Barth, 2011): 
 
#netsh int ipv6 set int “Ethernet” routerdiscovery=disabled 
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Linux: 
According to Grob and Hoffmann (2012), sysctl kernal configurations need to be used to 
provide instructions on how Router Advertisements should be processed. To prevent Linux 
from accepting a new prefix on the interface the following line needs to be uncommented in 
the sysctl.conf file: 
 
#net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding=1 
 
When the line is uncommented, Stateless Address Autoconfiguration is disabled so any 
Router Advertisement received is not processed by the host. 
 
5.3.3 RA Guard 
 
RA Guard drops Router Advertisements if they come from any switch port except the one to 
which the router is connected (Chown & Venaas, 2011). To enable the router to transmit 
Router Advertisements, a policy needs to be defined and applied to the router port to 
indicate that a router is connected to it (Cisco, 2014a). 
 
Previous researchers have only tested RA Guard without options. Therefore, in this study 
the RA Guard configuration included an option called ‘Match RA Address’. When this option 
is used, the switch attempts to match the source address of an incoming Router 
Advertisement with that of the legitimate router. If the switch is unable to match the source 
address, it drops the Router Advertisement (Cisco, 2014a).  
 
Step Command(s) Details 
1 #configure terminal Enters the global configuration mode 
2 
#interface vlan 1 
#ipv6 first hop security 
Applies IPv6 first hop security to the default 
VLAN. IPv6 first hop security refers to the 
suite of link-local IPv6 security features. 
3 
#interface vlan1 
#ipv6 nd raguard 
Enables the RA Guard security feature on 
the default VLAN. 
4 # ipv6 nd raguard policy router 
Creates an IPv6 RA Guard policy named  
‘router’. 
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Step Command(s) Details 
5 
#device-role router 
Specifies the role of the device within RA  
Guard policy as router. 
#interface gi8 
Specifies the type and number of the  
interface. 
4 
 
#ipv6 nd raguard attach-policy router 
 
Attaches the RA Guard policy named  
‘router’ to the Gigabit Ethernet 8 interface. 
5 #ipv6 nd raguard policy policy1 
Creates an IPv6 RA Guard policy named 
‘policy1’.  
 
6 #match ra address prefix-list list1  
Specifies the ‘match Router Advertisement 
address’ in a prefix list named ‘list1’. 
 
Matches the source address of the Router  
Advertisement to the address defined in the 
prefix list. 
 
7 
#ipv6 prefix-list list1 permit 
 FE80::212:d9ff:fed7:7968/64 
Specifies the router’s link-local address that 
needs to be permitted. 
Table 5-8: RA Guard configuration. 
 
Table 5-8 shows the commands that were used to configure RA Guard at the switch. As 
shown, a RA Guard policy attempts to prevent hosts from transmitting Router 
Advertisements.  
 
5.3.4 Neighbour Discovery Inspection - Validate Source MAC  
 
The Neighbour Discovery (ND) inspection policy in an IPv6 enabled switch checks NDP 
messages such as Router Advertisements. NDP messages were discussed in Section 2.4.2. 
The ND inspection Validate Source MAC policy can protect the network from spoofed Router 
Advertisements.  
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Figure 5-10: RA flood attacks use spoofed link-local IPv6 addresses and MAC addresses. 
 
Figure 5-10 shows a Wireshark screenshot of Router Advertisements received during a RA 
flood attack. The packets contain spoofed link-local IPv6 addresses and corresponding MAC 
addresses. Spoofing is used to hide the source of attack packets. There are various 
methods, which prevent spoofing-based attacks such as the ND inspection policy. 
 
In order to check the MAC addresses against the link-local IPv6 addresses, an ND 
inspection Validate Source MAC policy, needs to be defined. Once it is defined, the policy 
needs to be attached to a VLAN. The policy enables the switch to check the source IPv6 
addresses of packets against their source MAC addresses. If these do not match, the switch 
drops the packets (Cisco, 2014a).  
  
Step Command(s) Details 
1 #configure terminal Enters the global configuration mode. 
2 
#interface vlan 1 
#ipv6 first hop security 
Applies IPv6 first hop security to the 
default VLAN. IPv6 first hop security 
 refers to the suite of link-local IPv6 
 security features. 
3 
#interface vlan 1 
#ipv6 nd inspection 
Enables the NDP inspection feature on 
VLAN 1. 
4 #ipv6 nd inspection policy policy1 
Creates an ND inspection policy 
named ‘policy1’.  
5 #validate source-mac Checks MAC addresses against the 
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Step Command(s) Details 
link-layer address. 
6 
#interface vlan 1 
#ipv6 nd inspection attach-policy policy1  
Attaches the policy named ‘policy1’ 
to the default VLAN, VLAN 1. 
 
Table 5-9:  ND Inspection Validate Source MAC policy configuration (Cisco, 2014a). 
 
Table 5-9 shows the commands that were used to configure the ND Inspection Validate 
Source MAC policy in order to validate the source MAC addresses of Router 
Advertisements. 
 
5.3.5 VLAN  
 
VLANs may be used to lessen the impact of DoS attacks. If VLANs are used, the victim 
VLAN will not expend the entire bandwidth of the network during a DoS attack (Sen & 
Singha 2013). In this study, two VLANs were configured. The victim, attacker and router 
were on the same VLAN while the monitoring computers were on another VLAN. 
 
Step Command(s) Details 
1 #configure terminal Enters the global configuration mode. 
2 
#vlan 10 
#exit 
Creates a VLAN and assigns the VLAN 
ID, ‘vlan 10’ to it. 
3 #configure terminal Enters the global configuration mode. 
4 
#interface g0/1 
  
Specifies the type and number of the 
interface to be added to the VLAN 
(Gigabit Ethernet 0/1). 
5 #switchport mode access 
Specifies the port is an access port 
instead of a trunking port. 
6 #switchport access vlan 10  Assigns the interface to VLAN 10. 
Table 5-10: Configuration of VLANs (Cisco, 2009). 
 
Table 5-10 shows the steps that were used to create two VLANs for this study. Steps 4 to 6 
were repeated to assign the interfaces g0/2 and g0/3 to VLAN 10. Then steps 1 and 2 were 
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repeated to create VLAN 20 and interface g0/5 and g0/6 were assigned to VLAN 20 using 
steps 3 to 6. The router, victim computer and attack computer interfaces were assigned to 
VLAN 10 and the interfaces of monitoring computers were assigned to VLAN 20.  
 
Before the results were gathered, the attacks were launched and the packets/fragments 
were observed using Wireshark as discussed in Section 5.2.6. It was discovered that the 
attacks sent around 100,000 packets/fragments. The masses of packets sent during the 
attacks were expected to exhaust the switch’s resources so the performance of the 
monitoring VLAN was expected to suffer during attacks on the victim VLAN. 
 
A DoS attack can have an impact on switch’s finite hardware resources by flooding the 
switch with unnecessary packets. The forwarding capacity of the switch may be saturated; 
there may be random drops of incoming and outgoing traffic. Other problems can also occur 
such as Content Addressable Memory (CAM) table overflow (Cisco, 2005). CAM exhaustion 
can lead to switch performance degradation (Ranjbar, 2010). CAM tables will be discussed 
in Section 6.2.6. 
 
5.4 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter covered the experimental design that was used for this study. The testbed 
architecture was explained which included details on the hardware and software used. Then 
tools that were selected to measure the TCP throughput, TCP RTT and CPU utilisation were 
discussed. The protocol analyser and attack tool were also discussed. Five defence 
mechanisms against RA flood attacks were selected for the experiments. These were 
Access Control Lists, RA Guard, Disable Router Discovery, Validate Source MAC and 
VLAN. The steps used to configure these defence mechanisms were provided. The next 
chapter presents the analysis of defence mechanisms against three types RA flood attacks. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Evaluation of Defences against  
Router Advertisement Flood Attacks 
 
This chapter presents the evaluation of defence mechanisms against three types of ICMPv6 
Router Advertisement flood attacks. Each section includes the analysis of TCP throughput, 
TCP RTT and CPU utilisation results using Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0. Section 6.1 
covers the first type of ICMPv6 Router Advertisement flood attack (RA Flood Attack 1). The 
attack did not use packets with extension headers. Section 6.2 covers the second type of 
ICMPv6 Router Advertisement flood attack (RA Flood Attack 2). The attack used packets 
with fragment extension headers. Section 6.3 covers the third type of ICMPv6 Router 
Advertisement flood attack (RA Flood Attack 3). The attack used packets with fragment and 
destination options extension headers.  
 
The defence mechanisms, Access Control List (ACL), Disable Router Discovery, RA Guard, 
Validate Source MAC and VLAN were evaluated in Section 6.1. In addition to these, two 
defence mechanisms against attacks that exploit extension headers were evaluated in 
Section 6.2 and Section 6.3 namely ACL Fragments and ACL Undetermined-transport. 
 
6.1 Evaluation of Defence Mechanisms against RA Flood Attack 1  
 
This section includes the evaluation of defence mechanisms against the first type of ICMPv6 
Router Advertisement flood attack (RA Flood Attack 1) which was discussed in Section 
5.2.6. The Router Advertisements sent during this attack did not use extension headers. The 
attack flooded the local link with thousands of 1038-byte packets per second.  
 
Five defence mechanisms against the attack were analysed namely Access Control List 
(ACL), Disable Router Discovery, RA Guard, VLAN and Validate Source MAC. Section 5.3 
provided details on how these defence mechanisms were configured. The efficacy of each 
defence mechanism was analysed using TCP throughput, TCP RTT and CPU utilisation. 
The tools used to obtain the results were discussed in Section 5.2. 
 
When RA Flood Attack 1 was launched, the victim computer, which had an automatically 
configured IPv6 address, lost its network connection within seconds. Thus, it could not be 
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used to measure the impact of the attack on TCP throughput, TCP RTT and CPU utilisation. 
These metrics had to be measured between monitoring computers. The monitoring 
computers had static IPv6 addresses so they did not lose their network connections during 
the attacks. As discussed in Section 5.1, Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 exchanged roles for 
the tests. When Windows 8.1 was the monitoring computer, Debian 7.5.0 was the victim and 
vice versa.  
 
Results were gathered before and during the attack and after the defences were configured. 
The evaluation process was explained in Section 4.5.2. Each test was repeated so that 
consistent results could be obtained. Thus, tests were repeated until the standard deviation 
divided by the average was around 0.07 as discussed in Section 4.5.1. Appendix A provides 
the minimum, maximum, average and standard deviation values. 
 
6.1.1 TCP Throughput Results for Windows 8.1 
  
This section includes the TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1 with and without defences. 
The tools used to obtain the results in this section were Iperf and THC flood_router26. Iperf 
was used to measure the TCP throughput and attacks were launched using THC 
flood_router26. 
 
 
Figure 6-1: Average TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1 using Cisco 3560G. 
 
Figure 6-1 depicts the average TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1 with and without 
defences using the Cisco 3560G switch. When RA Flood Attack 1 was launched, the 
throughput dropped from 581 Mbps to 0 Mbps. Thus, it was not possible to transmit any 
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legitimate packets during the attack. As shown, Disable Router Discovery could only 
increase the throughput from 0 Mbps to 4.095 Mbps. On the other hand, ACL and VLAN 
increased the throughput from 0 Mbps to 580 Mbps and 575 Mbps respectively. These 
average values were very close to the average value obtained prior to the attack. 
 
 
Figure 6-2: Average TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1 using Cisco 300-10. 
 
Figure 6-2 shows the average TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1 with and without 
defences using the Cisco 300-10 switch. Before the attack, the throughput was 578 Mbps. It 
was not possible to send any legitimate packets during the attack. RA Guard and Validate 
Source MAC increased the throughput from 0 Mbps to 576.9 Mbps and 580.1 Mbps 
respectively.  
 
6.1.2 TCP Throughput Results for Debian 7.5.0 
 
This section includes the TCP throughput results for Debian 7.5.0 with and without defences. 
The tools used to obtain the results in this section were Iperf and THC flood_router26. Iperf 
was used to measure the TCP throughput and attacks were launched using THC 
flood_router26. 
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Figure 6-3: Average TCP throughput results for Debian 7.5.0 using Cisco 3560G. 
 
Figure 6-3 shows the average TCP throughput results for Debian 7.5.0 with and without 
defences using the Cisco 3560G switch. Before the attack, the average throughput was 
635.3 Mbps. Then during the attack, the throughput dropped to 4.123 Mbps. Disable Router 
Discovery was clearly the least effective method. It could only increase the throughput from 
4.123 Mbps to 4.419 Mbps. On the other hand, the other two defences significantly 
increased the throughput. ACL and VLAN increased the throughput from 4.123 Mbps to 
632.8 Mbps and 630.5 Mbps respectively.   
 
 
Figure 6-4: Average TCP throughput results for Debian 7.5.0 using Cisco 300-10. 
 
Figure 6-4 shows the average TCP throughput results for Debian 7.5.0 with and without 
defences using the Cisco 300-10 switch. The throughput dropped from 636.9 Mbps to 2.004 
Mbps during the attack. RA Guard and Validate Source MAC successfully increased the 
throughput from 2.004 Mbps to 632.9 Mbps and 635.1 Mbps respectively.  
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6.1.3 TCP Throughput Results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 
 
This section includes a comparison of TCP throughput results between Windows 8.1 and 
Debian 7.5.0. The tools used to obtain the results in this section were Iperf and THC 
flood_router26. Iperf was used to measure the TCP throughput and attacks were launched 
using THC flood_router26. 
 
Scenario Defence Mechanism 
Windows 8.1 
Average TCP 
 Throughput  
(Mbps)  
Debian 7.5.0 
 Average TCP 
 Throughput  
(Mbps) 
Before Attack –          581.000             635.300  
During Attack 
–              0.000                 4.123  
ACL          580.900             632.800  
Disable Router Discovery              4.095                 4.419  
VLAN          575.000             630.500  
Table 6-1: TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 using Cisco 3560G. 
 
Table 6-1 shows the average TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 with 
and without defences using the Cisco 3560G switch. As shown, the throughput decreased 
significantly on both operating systems during RA Flood Attack 1. Windows 8.1 throughput 
dropped from 581 Mbps to 0 Mbps when the attack was launched which means it was not 
possible to transmit any packets during the attack. On the other hand, Debian 7.5.0 
throughput dropped from 635.3 Mbps to 4.123 Mbps during the attack 
 
VLAN isolated the attack traffic and ACL dropped the attack packets at the switch thus, there 
was no network congestion when they were used. There were marginal differences between 
the results when the two effective defences were used. The average throughput values for 
these were similar to the average values obtained prior to the attack. 
 
Disable Router Discovery could not increase the throughput significantly for both operating 
systems. Since Disable Router Discovery had to be configured on the computer instead of 
the switch, it could not prevent the attack packets from consuming the network bandwidth. 
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Scenario Defence Mechanism 
Windows 8.1 
Average TCP 
throughput 
(Mbps)  
Debian 7.5.0 
Average TCP 
throughput  
(Mbps) 
Before Attack –          578.900             636.900  
During Attack 
–              0.000                 2.004  
RA Guard          576.900             632.900  
Validate Source MAC          580.100             635.100  
Table 6-2: TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 using Cisco 300-10. 
 
Table 6-2 shows the average TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 with 
and without defences using the Cisco 300-10 switch. Before the attack, the throughput was 
higher on Debian 7.5.0 compared to Windows 8.1. However, after the attack, the throughput 
dropped on both operating systems. While Debian 7.5.0 could still transmit packets at 2.004 
Mbps, Windows 8.1 could not transmit any packets at all. After RA Guard and Validate 
Source MAC were used, the Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 throughput results became 
normal because the defences dropped the attack packets at the switch.  
 
6.1.4 TCP RTT Results for Windows 8.1  
 
This section includes the TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 with and without defences. The 
tools used to obtain the results in this section were TCPing and THC flood_router26. TCPing 
was used to measure the TCP RTT and attacks were launched using THC flood_router26. 
 
 
Figure 6-5: Average TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 using Cisco 3560G. 
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Figure 6-5 illustrates the average TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 with and without 
defences using the Cisco 3560G switch. Prior to the attack, the average RTT was very low 
compared to the average RTT during the attack. ACL reduced the RTT from 128.479 
milliseconds to 0.579 milliseconds, which was more or less the same as the average value 
obtained before the attack. VLAN was also effective; the average value was somewhat 
higher than ACL at 0.6 milliseconds. However, it was lower than 1.965 milliseconds, which 
was the average RTT when Disable Router Discovery was used. 
 
 
Figure 6-6: Average TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 using Cisco 300-10. 
 
Figure 6-6 shows the average TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 with and without defences 
using the Cisco 300-10 switch. Before the attack, the RTT was 0.594 milliseconds. When the 
attack was launched, the RTT increased to 54.425 milliseconds. Both RA Guard and 
Validate Source MAC reduced the RTT considerably. 
 
6.1.5 TCP RTT Results for Debian 7.5.0  
 
This section includes the TCP RTT results for Debian 7.5.0 with and without defences. The 
tools used to obtain the results in this section were TCPing and THC flood_router26. TCPing 
was used to measure the TCP RTT and attacks were launched using THC flood_router26. 
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Figure 6-7: Average TCP RTT results for Debian 7.5.0 using Cisco 3560G. 
 
Figure 6-7 shows the average TCP RTT results for Debian 7.5.0 with and without defences 
using the Cisco 3560G switch. During the attack, the RTT increased from 0.582 milliseconds 
to 2.234 milliseconds. All three defences reduced the RTT. However, ACL and VLAN were 
more effective compared to Disable Router Discovery, which could only reduce the RTT 
from 2.234 milliseconds to 2.047 milliseconds. 
 
 
Figure 6-8: Average TCP RTT results for Debian 7.5.0 using Cisco 300-10. 
 
Figure 6-8 shows the average TCP RTT results for Debian 7.5.0 with and without defences 
using the Cisco 300-10 switch. The average RTT increased during the attack from 0.586 
milliseconds to 2.142 milliseconds. RA Guard and Validate Source MAC enabled the RTT to 
become normal. There were negligible differences between the average results when the 
defences were used. Therefore, both defences were equally effective. 
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6.1.6 TCP RTT Results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0  
 
This section includes a comparison of TCP RTT results between Windows 8.1 and Debian 
7.5.0. The tools used to obtain the results in this section were TCPing and THC 
flood_router26. TCPing was used to measure the TCP RTT and attacks were launched 
using THC flood_router26. 
 
Scenario Defence Mechanism 
Windows 8.1 
Average TCP RTT 
(ms)  
Debian 7.5.0 
Average TCP RTT 
(ms) 
Before Attack –            0.576                0.582 
During Attack 
–        128.479  2.234 
ACL            0.579  0.584 
Disable Router Discovery            1.965  2.047 
VLAN            0.600  0.592 
Table 6-3: Average TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 using Cisco 3560G. 
 
Table 6-3 shows the average TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 with and 
without defences using the Cisco 3560G switch. Prior to the attack, RTT was low on both 
Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0. After the attack was launched, the RTT increased from 
0.582 milliseconds to 2.234 milliseconds on Debian 7.5.0. It was still very low compared to 
Windows 8.1. The RTT increased significantly from 0.576 milliseconds to 128.479 
milliseconds on Windows 8.1. For both operating systems, all defences reduced the RTT as 
shown. However, Disable Router Discovery was not as effective as the other two defences. 
 
Scenario Defence Mechanism 
Windows 8.1 
Average TCP RTT 
(ms)  
Debian 7.5.0 
Average TCP RTT 
(ms) 
Before Attack –            0.594              0.586 
During Attack 
–           54.425              2.142 
RA Guard            0.598  0.588 
Validate Source MAC            0.610  0.594 
Table 6-4: Average TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 using Cisco 300-10. 
 
Table 6-4 shows the average TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 with and 
without defences using the Cisco 300-10 switch. Before the attack, the RTT was low on both 
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operating systems. During the attack however, the RTT increased considerably on Windows 
8.1. Even though the RTT also increased on Debian 7.5.0, it was not as high as the RTT on 
Windows 8.1. The results for both operating systems showed that RA Guard and Validate 
Source MAC were equally effective.  
 
When both Cisco 3560G and Cisco 300-10 were used, Linux outperformed Windows 8.1. 
Even though the RTT increased on Debian 7.5.0, it was not enough to cause any 
performance issues. On the other hand, the performance of Windows 8.1 deteriorated during 
the attack. It became very slow and on some occasions, it became unresponsive and 
required a cold reboot.  
 
According to Alangar & Swaminathan (2013), thousands of packets sent during flooding-
based RA attacks can cause Microsoft Windows computers to become overloaded with 
numerous SLAAC processes. Thus the malicious Router Advertisements sent during the 
attack can completely freeze the entire Windows environment.  
 
Malicious Router Advertisements can cause hosts to generate IPv6 addresses to update 
their routing tables. During a flooding-based RA attack, this can cause Windows to require a 
cold reboot. Current Windows operating systems suffer during RA flood attacks because 
they cannot limit the number of IPv6 addresses that can be assigned to their interfaces via 
Router Advertisements. The problem with Windows is that it tries to handle all the Router 
Advertisements it receives (Grob & Hoffman, 2012). Appendix B includes screenshots of the 
IPv6 configuration at Windows 8.1 during a RA Flood Attack 1, which lasted 3 seconds. 
 
Linux enforces a limit on the number of Router Advertisement information it receives. It only 
accepts a limited number of prefixes (Grob & Hoffman, 2012). Appendix C shows 
screenshots of the IPv6 configuration at Debian 7.5.0 during RA Flood Attack 1, which lasted 
3 seconds. 
 
6.1.7 CPU Utilisation Results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0    
             
This section includes a comparison of CPU utilisation results between Windows 8.1 and 
Debian 7.5.0. The tools used to obtain the results in this section were Resource Monitor, 
Saidar and THC flood_router26. Resource Monitor and Saidar were used to measure the 
CPU utilisation on Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 respectively. Attacks were launched using 
THC flood_router26. 
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Even though two different switches were used which supported different defence 
mechanisms, the results have been merged in the same graphs in this section. The results 
recorded prior to the attack and during the attack were identical on Windows 8.1 and also  
on Debian 7.5.0 thus it was not necessary to show the results in separate graphs. 
 
Bar graphs were used to represent the results in the preceding sections and for Debian 7.5.0 
in this section since the results obtained were very close to each other. On the other hand, 
the CPU utilisation results for Windows 8.1 had to be represented in a line graph in this 
section to show the increase and reduction in CPU utilisation during the attack. 
 
 
Figure 6-9: Windows 8.1 average CPU utilisation results. 
 
Figure 6-9 shows the average CPU utilisation results for Windows 8.1 before and during the 
attack. It also shows the results after the Disable Router Discovery method was used. The 
CPU utilisation values for the rest of the defences remained the same as the value recorded 
before the attack. For this reason, they have not been included in Figure 6-9 and Table 6-5. 
VLAN isolated the attack traffic and ACL, RA Guard and Validate Source MAC dropped the 
attack traffic at the switch. Therefore, Windows 8.1 CPU utilisation results did not show any 
changes when the aforementioned defences were used.  
 
As shown in Figure 6-9, the CPU was idle before the attack. When the attack was launched 
for 5 seconds, the CPU utilisation increased quickly from 0% to 100%. After 1000 
milliseconds, it dropped to 18.18% until the attack was stopped. When Windows 8.1 
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continued to process the malicious Router Advertisements. According to Weber (2013), 
hosts update their routing tables when they receive new routing entries. 
 
Disable Router Discovery decreased the CPU utilisation from 18.18% to 8% because it 
prevented Windows 8.1 from processing malicious Router Advertisements. The CPU 
utilisation continued to be 8% possibly because the unused Router Advertisements had to 
be dropped.  
 
Appendix D compares the impact of a RA flood attack on the victim Windows 8.1 computer 
to Windows 8.1 when it was used as a monitoring computer. On the victim Windows 8.1 
computer, the CPU utilisation increased from 0% to 100% and became 0% again within 
milliseconds. It updated its routing table with malicious routing entries. Thus, it lost its 
network connection, which is why the CPU utilisation became normal again. As shown in 
Appendix D and Figure 6-9, the Windows 8.1 monitoring computer could be used to observe 
the impact of the attack for a longer duration because it had a static address that prevented 
it from losing its network connection.  
 
Scenario Defence Mechanism Windows 8.1 Average  
CPU Utilisation (%) 
Before Attack –                              0.00 
During Attack 
–                            18.18 
Disable Router Discovery                              8.00 
Table 6-5: Average CPU utilisation results for Windows 8.1. 
 
Table 6-5 shows the average CPU utilisation results for Windows 8.1 before and during the 
attack as well as after the Disable Router Discovery method was used. As mentioned before, 
Disable Router Discovery decreased the CPU utilisation from 18.18% to 8%. The CPU 
utilisation remained constant at 8% until the attack was stopped.  
 
 
78 
 
 
 
Figure 6-10: Average CPU utilisation results for Debian 7.5.0. 
 
Figure 6-10 shows the average CPU utilisation results for Debian 7.5.0 before and after the 
defences were used. As shown, the attack did not have any effect on Debian’s CPU 
utilisation, which continued to be extremely low. As discussed in Section 6.1.6, Debian 7.5.0 
accepts a limited number of prefixes so numerous Router Advertisements did not have any 
effect on the CPU utilisation during the attack.  
 
In addition, Debian did not process any Router Advertisements after all five defences were 
used. All defences dropped the Router Advertisements at the switch except Disable Router 
Discovery but when Disable Router Discovery was used, Debian 7.5.0 did not create any 
routing entries. Debian 7.5.0 had to drop the unused Router Advertisements. Figure 6-10 
shows that this did not have any effect on the CPU utilisation. 
 
6.1.8 Observations at the Monitoring and Victim Computers 
 
As mentioned before, the TCP throughput, TCP RTT and CPU utilisation results could not be 
gathered using the victim computers since they lost their network connections when the 
attack was launched. The victim computers were only used to see if the defence 
mechanisms could enable them to maintain their network connections. It was observed that 
all five defences prevented Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 from losing their network 
connections. 
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Disable Router Discovery prevented the victim computers from processing Router 
Advertisements and losing their network connections. Thus, the defence appeared to be 
effective at the victim computers. However, the TCP throughput, and TCP RTT results 
obtained using the monitoring computers showed that it was ineffective compared to the 
other four defences. The results were different for CPU utilisation. While Disable Router 
Discovery reduced the CPU utilisation on Windows 8.1, it did not have any effect on Debian 
7.5.0. 
 
6.2 Evaluation of Defence Mechanisms against RA Flood Attack 2 
 
This section includes the evaluation of defence mechanisms against the second type of 
ICMPv6 Router Advertisement flood attack (RA Flood Attack 2) which was discussed in 
Section 5.2.6. The attack flooded the local link with thousands of 1046-byte packets per 
second. The Router Advertisement packets sent during this attack used fragment extension 
headers. In other words, the attack packets were divided into fragments before they were 
sent. Router Advertisement flood attacks that utilise extension headers were discussed in 
Section 3.2.1.  
 
Seven defence mechanisms against the attack were analysed namely ACL, ACL Fragments, 
ACL Undetermined-transport, Disable Router Discovery, RA Guard, Validate Source MAC 
and VLAN. Section 5.3 provided details on how these defence mechanisms were configured. 
The efficacy of each defence mechanism was analysed using TCP throughput, TCP RTT 
and CPU utilisation. The tools used to obtain results were discussed in Section 5.2. 
 
When RA Flood Attack 2 was launched, the victim computer, which had an automatically 
configured IPv6 address, lost its network connection within seconds. Thus, it could not be 
used to measure the impact of the attack on TCP throughput, TCP RTT and CPU utilisation. 
These metrics had to be measured between monitoring computers. The monitoring 
computers had static IPv6 addresses so they did not lose their network connections during 
the attacks. As discussed in Section 5.1, Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 exchanged roles for 
the tests. When Windows 8.1 was the monitoring computer, Debian 7.5.0 was the victim and 
vice versa.  
 
Results were gathered before and during the attack and after the defences were configured. 
The evaluation process was explained in Section 4.5.2. Each test was repeated so that 
consistent results could be obtained. Thus, tests were repeated until the standard deviation 
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divided by the average was around 0.07 as discussed in Section 4.5.1. Appendix A provides 
the minimum, maximum, average and standard deviation values. 
 
6.2.1 TCP Throughput Results for Windows 8.1  
 
This section includes the TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1 with and without defences. 
The tools used to obtain the results in this section were Iperf and THC flood_router26. Iperf 
was used to measure the TCP throughput and attacks were launched using THC 
flood_router26. 
 
 
Figure 6-11: Average TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1 using Cisco 3560G. 
 
Figure 6-11 depicts the average TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1 with and without 
defences using the Cisco 3560G switch. After RA Flood Attack 2 was launched, the 
throughput dropped from 581 Mbps to 0 Mbps. ACL, ACL Fragments, ACL Undetermined-
transport and VLAN were effective defences as they significantly increased the throughput. 
The average values obtained when these defences were used were close to the average 
value obtained prior to the attack. Disable Router Discovery was ineffective as it only 
succeeded in increasing the throughput from 0 Mbps to 4.194 Mbps.  
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Figure 6-12: Average TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1 using Cisco 300-10. 
 
Figure 6-12 shows the average TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 with and without defences 
using the Cisco 300-10 switch. The throughput was 578.9 Mbps before the attack. During 
the attack, legitimate packets could not be transmitted thus the throughput was 0 Mbps. Both 
RA Guard and Validate Source MAC were ineffective as they failed to increase the 
throughput. 
 
6.2.2 TCP Throughput Results for Debian 7.5.0 
 
This section includes the TCP throughput results for Debian 7.5.0 with and without defences. 
The tools used to obtain the results in this section were Iperf and THC flood_router26. Iperf 
was used to measure the TCP throughput and attacks were launched using THC 
flood_router26. 
 
 
Figure 6-13: Average TCP throughput results for Debian 7.5.0 using Cisco 3560G. 
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Figure 6-13 illustrates the average TCP throughput results for Debian 7.5.0 with and without 
defences using the Cisco 3560G switch. Before the attack, the throughput was 635.3 Mbps. 
When the attack was launched, the throughput dropped to 4.131 Mbps. There were marginal 
differences between the throughput results when ACL, ACL Fragments, ACL Undetermined-
transport and VLAN were used. All four defences succeeded in increasing the throughput. 
Disable Router Discovery was ineffective, as it could not increase the throughput 
significantly.  
 
 
Figure 6-14: Average TCP throughput results for Debian 7.5.0 using Cisco 300-10. 
 
Figure 6-14 shows the average TCP throughput results for Debian 7.5.0 with and without 
defences using the Cisco 300-10 switch. After the attack was launched, the throughput 
dropped from 636.9 Mbps to 2.001 Mbps. Both RA Guard and Validate Source MAC were 
ineffective, as they could not increase the throughput.  
 
6.2.3 TCP Throughput Results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 
 
This section includes a comparison of TCP throughput results between Windows 8.1 and 
Debian 7.5.0. The tools used to obtain the results in this section were Iperf and THC 
flood_router26. Iperf was used to measure the TCP throughput and attacks were launched 
using THC flood_router26. 
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Scenario Defence Mechanism 
Windows 8.1 
Average TCP 
Throughput 
(Mbps) 
Debian 7.5.0 
Average TCP 
Throughput 
(Mbps) 
During Attack 
–              0.000             4.131  
ACL          577.900         633.500  
ACL Fragments          579.400         632.900  
ACL Undetermined-transport          569.900         632.400  
Disable Router Discovery              4.194             4.364  
VLAN          575.900         630.500  
Table 6-6: TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 using Cisco 3560G. 
 
Table 6-6 shows the average TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 with 
and without defences using the Cisco 3560G switch. Before the attack, Debian 7.5.0 
throughput was higher at 633.9 Mbps compared to Windows 8.1 throughput, which was 581 
Mbps. During the attack, the throughput decreased considerably on both operating systems. 
Packets could still be transmitted at 4.131 Mbps on Debian 7.5.0 during the attack. On the 
contrary, the attack caused Windows 8.1 throughput to drop from 581 Mbps to 0 Mbps. 
According to Mirkovic et al. (2009), TCP-based traffic, lowers the rate at which it is sending 
packets as a response to network congestion. 
 
The results obtained using both Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 showed that only ACL, ACL 
Fragments, ACL Undetermined-transport and VLAN were effective. Disable Router 
Discovery could not increase the throughput as efficiently as the other four defences for both 
operating systems.  
 
Scenario Defence Mechanism 
Windows 8.1 
Average TCP 
Throughput 
(Mbps) 
Debian 7.5.0 
Average 
TCP throughput 
(Mbps) 
Before Attack –          578.900         636.900  
During Attack 
–              0.000             2.001  
RA Guard              0.000             1.981  
Validate Source MAC              0.000             2.004  
Table 6-7: TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 using Cisco 300-10. 
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Table 6-7 shows the average TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 with 
and without defences using the Cisco 300-10 switch. Before the attack, the average 
throughput was lower on Windows 8.1 compared to Debian 7.5.0. During the attack, 
Windows 8.1 throughput dropped to 0 Mbps. Even though Debian 7.5.0 throughput also 
dropped, it could still transmit traffic at 2.001 Mbps. RA Guard and Validate Source MAC 
could not stop the large number of fragmented packets transmitted during the attack from 
significantly reducing the throughput. The reason why Debian 7.5.0 outperformed Windows 
8.1 was discussed in Section 6.1.6. 
 
6.2.4 TCP RTT Results for Windows 8.1  
 
This section presents the TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 with and without defences. The 
tools used to obtain the results in this section were TCPing and THC flood_router26. TCPing 
was used to measure the TCP RTT and attacks were launched using THC flood_router26. 
 
 
Figure 6-15: Average TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 using Cisco 3560G. 
 
Figure 6-15 illustrates the average TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 with and without 
defences using the Cisco 3560G switch. When the attack was launched, the RTT increased 
significantly from 0.576 milliseconds to 355.042 milliseconds. Disable Router Discovery 
reduced the RTT from 355.042 milliseconds to 2.038 milliseconds. However, it was not as 
effective as ACL Undetermined-transport, ACL Fragments, ACL and VLAN. 
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Figure 6-16: Average TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 using Cisco 300-10. 
 
Figure 6-16 shows the average TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 with and without defences 
using the Cisco 300-10 switch. During the attack, the RTT increased from 0.594 milliseconds 
to 132.719 milliseconds. RA Guard and Validate Source MAC failed to decrease the RTT. 
 
6.2.5 TCP RTT Results for Debian 7.5.0 
 
This section presents the TCP RTT results for Debian 7.5.0 with and without defences. The 
tools used to obtain the results in this section were TCPing and THC flood_router26. TCPing 
was used to measure the TCP RTT and attacks were launched using THC flood_router26. 
 
 
Figure 6-17: Average TCP RTT results for Debian 7.5.0 using Cisco 3560G. 
 
Figure 6-17 illustrates the average TCP RTT results for Debian 7.5.0 with and without 
defences using the Cisco 3560G switch. The attack increased the RTT from 0.582 
milliseconds to 2.159 milliseconds. Disable Router Discovery was inefficient compared to the 
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succeeded in significantly decreasing the RTT. The results for these defences were quite 
close to the results obtained prior to the attack. 
 
As with other Cisco Catalyst switches, the Cisco 3560G  performs ACL lookups in ASIC 
hardware, thus the forwarding performance of the switch is not compromised when ACLs are 
used (Cisco, 2014b).  
  
 
Figure 6-18: Average TCP RTT results for Debian 7.5.0 using Cisco 300-10. 
 
Figure 6-18 shows the average TCP RTT results for Debian 7.5.0 with and without defences 
using the Cisco 300-10 switch. The average RTT before the attack was 0.586 milliseconds. 
During the attack, the RTT increased to 2.135 milliseconds. As shown, RA Guard and 
Validate Source MAC were did not work. 
 
6.2.6 TCP RTT Results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 
 
This section includes a comparison of TCP RTT results between Windows 8.1 and Debian 
7.5.0. The tools used to obtain the results in this section were TCPing and THC 
flood_router26. TCPing was used to measure the TCP RTT and attacks were launched 
using THC flood_router26. 
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Scenario Defence Mechanism 
Windows 8.1 
Average TCP RTT 
(ms)  
Debian 7.5.0 
Average TCP RTT 
(ms) 
ACL Fragments              0.582               0.586 
ACL Undetermined-transport              0.581               0.590 
Disable Router Discovery              2.038               2.065 
VLAN              0.596               0.595 
Table 6-8: Average TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 using Cisco 3560G. 
 
Table 6-8 shows the average TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 with and 
without defences using the Cisco 3560G switch. Before the attack, Windows RTT was 
slightly higher than the RTT on Debian 7.5.0. During the attack, Debian RTT increased from 
0.582 to 2.159 however, it was very low compared to Windows 8.1. The RTT increased 
significantly on Windows 8.1 from 0.576 to 355.042 Mbps during the attack.  
 
When the defences were used, the results for both operating systems showed that ACL, 
ACL Fragments, ACL Undetermined-transport and VLAN outperformed Disable Router 
Discovery. The average values obtained when the four effective defences were used were 
close to the average value obtained before the attack was launched. 
 
Scenario Defence Mechanism 
Windows 8.1 
Average TCP RTT 
(ms)  
Debian 7.5.0 
Average TCP RTT 
(ms) 
Before Attack –              0.594               0.586 
During Attack 
–          132.719               2.135 
RA Guard          133.183               2.127 
Validate Source MAC          132.499               2.141 
Table 6-9: Average TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 using Cisco 300-10. 
 
Table 6-9 shows the average TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 with and 
without defences using the Cisco 300-10 switch. Prior to the attack, the RTT was low on 
both Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0. During the attack, the RTT was much higher on 
Windows 8.1 than it was on Debian 7.5.0. For both operating systems, RA Guard and 
Validate Source MAC were ineffective.  
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Before the attack, the RTT values were low on both operating systems. Both Windows 8.1 
and Debian 7.5.0 results showed that the defences failed to drop the attack packets at the 
switch. Debian 7.5.0 RTT was much lower compared to Windows 8.1 RTT. As discussed in 
Section 6.1.6, Windows continued to process the malicious Router Advertisements thus, the 
RTT increased significantly during the attack. Debian 7.5.0 processed only one Router 
Advertisement so the RTT was very low compared to Windows 8.1.  
 
When both Cisco 3560G and Cisco 300-10 switches were used, Debian 7.5.0 did not 
experience any performance issues. On the contrary, Windows 8.1 became very slow and 
some tests had to be repeated because Windows 8.1 became unresponsive during the 
attacks. When the attacks were stopped, Windows 8.1 recovered and attacks were launched 
again. However, a cold reboot was required on a few occasions. 
 
Since the attack tested in this section (RA Flood Attack 2) used larger fragmented packets 
(1046-byte Router Advertisements), the RTT results were higher compared to the RTT 
results obtained during RA Flood Attack 1 which used 1038-byte packets as discussed in 
Section 5.2.6. 
 
Before attacks, there were negligible differences between the TCP throughput and TCP RTT 
results obtained using Cisco 3560G and Cisco 300-10. On the other hand, the results were 
different when results were gathered during attacks. Before the attacks, each packet the 
switch forwarded was from a single source address (the monitoring computer). However, 
during the attacks, the packets used multiple spoofed source addresses as discussed in 
Section 5.3.4. 
 
Layer 2 switching can be performed rapidly using a memory table called Content-
addressable Memory (CAM) table. CAM tables store MAC addresses to forward packets 
between ports (Cisco, 2010). The switch copies incoming packets to learn their MAC 
addresses if the address is not present on the CAM table however; the original packets are 
forwarded in hardware (Ranjbar, 2010). MAC address learning is relatively slower than the 
packet forwarding process even if MAC address learning is completely implemented in 
hardware (Cisco, 2007). 
 
The amount of IP routes or MAC addresses a switch can learn depends on the maximum 
size of its CAM table (Wong & Yeung, 2009). The Cisco 300-10 supports 8000 MAC 
addresses (Cisco, 2010) and Cisco 3560G supports 12,000 MAC addresses (Cisco, 2014b). 
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It is important to note that the size of the CAM tables as well as the default behaviour of 
switches can vary (Boyles, 2010).  
 
6.2.7 CPU Utilisation Results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 
 
This section includes a comparison of CPU utilisation results between Windows 8.1 and 
Debian 7.5.0. The tools used to obtain the results in this section were Resource Monitor, 
Saidar and THC flood_router26. Resource Monitor and Saidar were used to measure the 
CPU utilisation on Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 respectively. Attacks were launched using 
THC flood_router26. 
 
Even though two different switches were used which supported different defence 
mechanisms, the results have been merged in the graphs in this section. The results 
recorded prior to the attack and during the attack were identical on Windows 8.1 and also on 
Debian 7.5.0 thus it was not necessary to show the results in separate graphs. 
 
A bar graph could not be used to represent the CPU utilisation results for Windows 8.1 
because the results were not close to each other (as with most of the results discussed in 
this chapter). A line graph was required to show the rapid increase and reduction in CPU 
utilisation when the attack was launched. 
 
 
Figure 6-19: Windows 8.1 average CPU utilisation results. 
 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000 
Before Attack During Attack 
Disable Router Discovery RA Guard 
  Time (ms) 
C
PU
 U
til
is
at
io
n 
(%
) 
 
90 
 
 
Figure 6-19 shows the average CPU utilisation results for Windows 8.1 with and without 
defences. During the attack, the CPU utilisation increased rapidly and then it dropped. The 
three defences followed identical trends as shown. 
 
Only the results for Disable Router Discovery, RA Guard and Validate Source MAC have 
been included in Figure 6-19 because the average values for ACL, ACL Fragments, ACL 
Undetermined-transport and VLAN were the same as the average value obtained prior to the 
attack. When these effective defences were used, the attack packets could not have any 
impact on CPU utilisation on Windows 8.1. 
 
Scenario Defence Mechanism Average CPU Utilisation (%) 
Before Attack –  0.00 
During Attack 
–                       17.91 
Disable Router Discovery  8.00 
RA Guard                       17.00 
Validate Source MAC                       15.53 
Table 6-10: Average CPU utilisation results for Windows 8.1. 
 
Table 6-10 shows the average CPU utilisation results for Windows 8.1. During the attack, the 
CPU utilisation quickly increased from 0% to 100% and then the average value was 17.91%. 
The explanation for the increase and reduction was given in Section 6.1.7. 
 
The CPU utilisation increased when RA Guard, Validate Source MAC and Disable Router 
Discovery were used. The CPU utilisation decreased from 17.91% to 8% when Disable 
Router Discovery was used and remained constant at 8% until the attack was stopped. The 
average results for RA Guard and Validate Source MAC were 17% and 15.53% respectively. 
The CPU utilisation for the rest of the defences was 0%. 
 
RA Guard and Validate Source MAC were clearly ineffective. Disable Router Discovery 
decreased the CPU utilisation from 17.91% to 8%. Section 6.1.7 provided an explanation for 
the reduction in CPU utilisation when Disable Router Discovery was used. 
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Figure 6-20: Average CPU utilisation results for Debian 7.5.0. 
 
Figure 6-20 depicts the average CPU utilisation results for Debian 7.5.0 with and without 
defences. The CPU utilisation was very low prior to the attack. The CPU utilisation results 
did not show any significant changes as shown. 
 
6.2.8 Observations at the Monitoring and Victim Computers 
 
As mentioned before, the TCP throughput, TCP RTT and CPU utilisation results could not be 
gathered using the victim computers since they lost their network connections once the 
attack was launched. Therefore, the victim computers were only used to see if the defence 
mechanisms could enable them to maintain their network connections.  
 
The victim computers maintained their network connections when ACL, ACL Fragments, 
ACL Undetermined-transport, Disable Router Discovery and VLAN were used. RA Guard 
and Validate Source MAC were ineffective since they could not prevent the victim computers 
from losing their network connections. As discussed in Section 6.1.8, Disable Router 
Discovery only appeared to be effective. 
 
6.3 Evaluation of Defence Mechanisms against RA Flood Attack 3 
 
This section includes the evaluation of defence mechanisms against the third type of 
ICMPv6 Router Advertisement flood attack (RA Flood Attack 3) which was discussed in 
0.3 
0.27 
0.3 
0.25 
0.24 
0.25 
0.25 
0.27 
0.29 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 
Before Attack 
During Attack 
ACL 
ACL Fragments 
ACL Undetermined-transport 
Disable Router Discovery 
Raguard 
Validate Source MAC 
VLAN 
    RTT  (ms) 
D
ef
en
ce
 M
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
 
92 
 
 
Section 5.2.6. The Router Advertisements sent during this attack used the fragment and 
destination options extension headers. The attack flooded the local link with thousands of 
1302-byte and 78-byte fragments. Some fragments could be reassembled into Router 
Advertisements while the rest of them were created using malformed packets so they could 
not be reassembled. Router Advertisement flood attacks that utilise extension headers were 
discussed in Section 3.2.1. 
 
Five defence mechanisms were evaluated against RA Flood Attack 3, namely ACL, ACL 
Fragments, ACL Undetermined-transport, Disable Router Discovery, Validate Source MAC 
and VLAN. Section 5.3 provided details on how these defence mechanisms were configured. 
The efficacy of each defence mechanism was analysed using TCP throughput, TCP RTT 
and CPU utilisation. The tools used to obtain results were discussed in Section 5.2. 
 
RA Guard and Validate Source MAC possibly exhausted the resources of the switch 
because it was not possible to send any legitimate packets to measure the TCP throughput 
and TCP RTT when they were used.  
 
When RA Flood Attack 3 was launched, the victim computer, which had an automatically 
configured IPv6 address, lost its network connection within seconds. Thus, it could not be 
used to measure the impact of the attack on TCP throughput, TCP RTT and CPU utilisation. 
These metrics had to be measured between monitoring computers. The monitoring 
computers had static IPv6 addresses so they did not lose their network connections during 
the attacks. As discussed in Section 5.1, Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 exchanged roles for 
the tests. When Windows 8.1 was the monitoring computer, Debian 7.5.0 was the victim and 
vice versa.  
 
Results were gathered before and during the attack and after the defences were configured. 
The evaluation process was explained in Section 4.5.2. Each test was repeated so that 
consistent results could be obtained. Thus, tests were repeated until the standard deviation 
divided by the average was around 0.07 as discussed in Section 4.5.1. Appendix A provides 
the minimum, maximum, average and standard deviation values. 
 
6.3.1 TCP Throughput Results for Windows 8.1 
 
This section presents the TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1 with and without 
defences. The tools used to obtain the results in this section were Iperf and THC 
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flood_router26. Iperf was used to measure the TCP throughput and attacks were launched 
using THC flood_router26. 
 
 
Figure 6-21: Average TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1. 
 
Figure 6-21 illustrates the average TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1 with and without 
defences. After RA Flood Attack 3 was launched, the throughput dropped from 581 Mbps to 
393.8 Mbps. ACL, ACL Fragments and Disable Router Discovery could not increase the 
throughput. ACL Undetermined-transport and VLAN were the only defences that worked. 
When these two defences were used, the average values obtained were close to the 
average value prior to the attack. 
 
6.3.2 TCP Throughput Results for Debian 7.5.0 
 
This section includes the TCP throughput results for Debian 7.5.0 with and without defences. 
The tools used to obtain the results in this section were Iperf and THC flood_router26. Iperf 
was used to measure the TCP throughput and attacks were launched using THC 
flood_router26.   
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Figure 6-22: Average TCP throughput results for Debian 7.5.0. 
 
Figure 6-22 shows the average TCP throughput results for Debian.7.5.0 with and without 
defences. During the attack, the throughput dropped from 635.3 Mbps to 435.4 Mbps. VLAN 
and ACL Undetermined-transport increased the throughput from 435.4 Mbps to 630.8 Mbps 
and 626.4 Mbps respectively. They were the only defences that worked. 
 
6.3.3 TCP Throughput Results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 
 
This section presents a comparison of TCP throughput results between Windows 8.1 and 
Debian 7.5.0. The tools used to obtain the results in this section were Iperf and THC 
flood_router26. Iperf was used to measure the TCP throughput and attacks were launched 
using THC flood_router26.  
 
Scenario Defence Mechanism 
Windows 8.1 
Average TCP 
Throughput 
(Mbps)  
Debian 7.5.0 
Average 
TCP Throughput 
(Mbps) 
Before Attack –           581.0           635.3  
During Attack 
–           393.8           435.4  
ACL           411.9           437.0  
ACL Fragments           426.6           452.7  
ACL Undetermined-transport           570.5           626.4  
Disable Router Discovery           417.1           438.7  
VLAN           576.7           630.8   
Table 6-11: Average TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0. 
635.3 
435.4 
437 
452.7 
626.4 
438.7 
630.8 
0 200 400 600 800 
Before Attack 
During Attack 
ACL 
ACL Fragments 
ACL Undetermined-transport 
Disable Router Discovery 
VLAN 
    RTT  (ms) 
D
ef
en
ce
 M
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
 
95 
 
 
Table 6-11 shows the average TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 
with and without defences. During the attack, Windows 8.1 throughput dropped from 581 
Mbps to 393.8 Mbps while Debian 7.5.0 throughput dropped from 635.3 Mbps to 435.4 
Mbps. For both operating systems, ACL, ACL Fragments and Disable Router Discovery 
could not increase the throughput. Only VLAN and ACL Undetermined-transport were 
effective.  
 
The attack did not reduce the legitimate traffic considerably for Windows 8.1 and Debian 
7.5.0 when they were monitoring computers as shown in Table 6-11. When Windows 8.1 
and Debian 7.5.0 were victim computers during this attack, they lost their network 
connections.  
 
Therefore, it can be said that if this attack occurs on a real network, the computers with static 
IPv6 addresses will not be affected as severely as the computers that need automatically 
assigned addresses. As with the statically configured monitoring computers, the computers 
with static IPv6 addresses will be able to exchange legitimate packets. On the other hand, 
the computers that have automatically configured IPv6 addresses will lose their network 
connections. 
 
6.3.4 TCP RTT Results for Windows 8.1 
 
This section includes the TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 with and without defences. The 
tools used to obtain the results in this section were TCPing and THC flood_router26. TCPing 
was used to measure the TCP RTT and attacks were launched using THC flood_router26. 
 
 
Figure 6-23: Average TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1. 
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Figure 6-23 shows the average TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 with and without defences. 
The attack increased the RTT from 0.576 milliseconds to 0.953 milliseconds. VLAN was the 
most effective defence followed by ACL Undetermined-transport, Disable Router Discovery 
and ACL Fragments. There were minor differences between the average results obtained 
when ACL Undetermined-transport, Disable Router Discovery and ACL Fragments were 
used. The results for ACL were higher at 0.703 milliseconds compared to the other 
defences.  
 
6.3.5 TCP RTT Results for Debian 7.5.0 
 
This section includes the TCP RTT results for Debian 7.5.0 with and without defences. The 
tools used to obtain the results in this section were TCPing and THC flood_router26. TCPing 
was used to measure the TCP RTT and attacks were launched using THC flood_router26. 
 
 
Figure 6-24: Average TCP RTT results for Debian 7.5.0. 
 
Figure 6-24 illustrates the average TCP RTT results for Debian 7.5.0 with and without 
defences. The RTT increased from 0.582 milliseconds to 0.885 milliseconds during the 
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milliseconds. VLAN was also effective as the RTT dropped from 0.885 milliseconds to 0.599 
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Fragments and Disable Router Discovery were used, the RTT was higher than 0.582 
milliseconds, which was the average RTT before the attack. 
 
6.3.6 TCP RTT Results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 
 
This section presents a comparison of TCP RTT results between Windows 8.1 and Debian 
7.5.0. The tools used to obtain the results in this section were TCPing and THC 
flood_router26. TCPing was used to measure the TCP RTT and attacks were launched 
using THC flood_router26. 
 
Scenario Defence Mechanism 
Windows 8.1 
Average  
TCP RTT (ms)  
Debian 7.5.0 
Average 
TCP RTT (ms) 
Before Attack – 0.576 0.582 
During Attack 
– 0.953 0.885 
ACL 0.703 0.663 
ACL Fragments 0.677 0.648 
ACL Undetermined-transport 0.657 0.588 
Disable Router Discovery 0.669 0.662 
VLAN 0.583 0.599 
Table 6-12: Average TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0. 
 
Table 6-12 shows the average TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 with and 
without defences. Windows 8.1 RTT increased from 0.576 milliseconds to 0.953 milliseconds 
during the attack. On Debian 7.5.0, the RTT increased from 0.582 milliseconds to 0.885 
milliseconds. Prior to the attack, the RTT on both operating systems were low. During the 
attack however, the RTT was higher on Windows 8.1 compared to Debian 7.5.0. 
 
The RTT results were better on Debian 7.5.0 compared to Windows 8.1 when ACL was 
used. On both operating systems, the RTT results showed that ACL, ACL Fragments and 
Disable Router Discovery methods succeeded in reducing the RTT but they were not as 
effective as VLAN and ACL Undetermined-transport.  
 
From the results, it can be concluded that ACL failed to detect fragments that belonged to 
Router Advertisements. When ACL Fragments was used, no malicious IPv6 addresses were 
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found on the Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 computers. However, ACL Fragments could not 
increase the TCP Throughput or reduce the TCP RTT. 
 
6.3.7 CPU Utilisation Results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 
 
This section presents a comparison of CPU utilisation results between Windows 8.1 and 
Debian 7.5.0. The tools used to obtain the results in this section were Resource Monitor, 
Saidar and THC flood_router26. Resource Monitor and Saidar were used to measure the 
CPU utilisation on Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 respectively. Attacks were launched using 
THC flood_router26. 
 
A bar graph could not be used to represent the CPU utilisation results for Windows 8.1 
because the results were not close to each other (as with most of the results discussed in 
this chapter). A line graph was required to show the increase in CPU utilisation during the 
attack. 
 
 
Figure 6-25: Average CPU utilisation results for Windows 8.1. 
 
Figure 6-25 shows the average CPU utilisation for Windows 8.1 without defences. Prior to 
the attack, the CPU utilisation was 0%. During the attack, the CPU utilisation increased to 
5% and remained constant until the attack was stopped. ACL, ACL Fragments and Disable 
Router Discovery did not make any difference to the CPU utilisation during the attack. The 
CPU remained constant at 5% so it was not necessary to include the results in Figure 6-25. 
In contrast, VLAN and ACL Undetermined-transport did not have any effect on the CPU 
utilisation. The CPU utilisation was 0% when the two defences were used.  
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Figure 6-26: Average CPU utilisation results for Debian 7.5.0. 
 
Figure 6-26 shows the average CPU utilisation results for Debian 7.5.0 before and after the 
defences were used. The CPU utilisation was very low before the attacks and no significant 
changes were observed during the attacks as well as after the defences were used. 
 
6.3.8 Observations at the Monitoring and Victim Computers 
 
The TCP throughput, TCP RTT and CPU utilisation results could not be gathered on the 
victim computers since they lost their network connections once the RA Flood Attack 3 was 
launched. Therefore, the victim computers were only used to see if the defence mechanisms 
could enable them to maintain their network connections.  
 
After the defences were used, the victim computers could only maintain their network 
connections when ACL Fragments, ACL Undetermined-transport and VLAN were used. The 
rest of the defences were ineffective since they could not prevent the victim computers from 
losing their network connections.  
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Figure 6-27: Fragments received when ACL Fragments was used. 
 
Figure 6-27 shows a Wireshark screenshot of fragments that were received when ACL 
Fragments was used during RA Flood Attack 3. ACL Fragments used the ‘fragments’ 
keyword which enabled it to drop non-initial fragments that did not have a ULP. This was 
discussed in Section 3.4.1.3. Since ACL Fragments dropped non-initial fragments that did 
not have a ULP during RA Flood Attack 3, the rest of the fragments that bypassed the switch 
could not be used to reassemble the original malicious Router Advertisements from which 
the fragments were formed before they were sent.  
 
Since the victim computers did not receive any malicious Router Advertisements, they did 
not lose their network connections. However, the fragments that were allowed to bypass the 
switch when ACL Fragments was used caused the TCP throughput and TCP RTT results to 
be similar to the results obtained during the attack without any defences. The same could be 
said about Windows 8.1 CPU utilisation results. 
 
 
 
101 
 
 
 
Figure 6-28: Fragments received when ACL Undetermined-transport was used. 
 
Figure 6-28 shows a Wireshark screenshot of fragments that were received when ACL 
Undetermined-transport was used during RA Flood Attack 3. ACL Undetermined-transport 
dropped initial fragments without a ULP. The undetermined-transport keyword was 
discussed in Section 3.4.1.3. ACL Undetermined-transport enabled victim computers to 
maintain their network connections so the results obtained using the monitoring computers 
became normal. 
 
6.4 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter covered the evaluation of defence mechanisms against three types of Router 
Advertisement flood attacks. These were RA Flood Attack 1, RA Flood Attack 2 and RA 
Flood Attack 3. RA Flood Attack 1 did not use packets with extension headers, RA Flood 
Attack 2 used packets with fragment extension headers and RA Flood Attack 3 used packets 
with fragment and destination options headers.  
 
The efficacy of each defence mechanism was evaluated using TCP throughput, TCP RTT 
and CPU utilisation results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 monitoring computers. 
Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 victim computers were also examined to evaluate the 
efficacies of defence mechanisms.  
 
The defence mechanisms against RA flood attacks, ACL, Disable Router Discovery, RA 
Guard, Validate Source MAC and VLAN were evaluated. Two defence mechanisms against 
RA flood attacks that misuse extension headers were also evaluated namely ACL 
Fragments and ACL Undetermined-transport. 
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All three attacks caused the computers with automatically configured IPv6 addresses (victim 
computers) to lose their network connections. However, the attacks had different impacts on 
the computers with statically configured IPv6 addresses. 
 
During RA Flood Attack 1 and RA Flood Attack 2, TCP throughput decreased significantly on 
both Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0. While Debian 7.5.0 could still transmit some packets 
during the attack, Windows 8.1 could not transmit any packets at all. TCP RTT increased on 
Debian 7.5.0 but it was very low compared to Windows 8.1. RA Flood Attack 1 and RA Flood 
Attack 2 caused the CPU utilisation to increase on Windows 8.1. The attacks did not have 
any effect on the CPU utilisation on Debian 7.5.0. 
 
RA Flood Attack 3 did not use as many packets as RA Flood Attack 1 and RA Flood Attack 
2. Therefore, compared to the two attacks, RA Flood Attack 3 did not reduce the TCP 
throughput or increase the TCP RTT significantly on both Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0. 
The attack caused the CPU utilisation to increase slightly on Windows 8.1 and like the other 
two attacks; it did not have any effect on the CPU utilisation on Debian 7.5.0. 
 
During RA Flood Attack 1, all defences were effective except Disable Router Discovery. RA 
Guard, Validate Source MAC and Disable Router Discovery, were the most ineffective 
defences against RA Flood Attack 2 and RA Flood Attack 3. ACL, ACL Fragments, ACL 
Undetermined-transport and VLAN were effective defences against RA Flood Attack 2. Only 
ACL Undetermined-transport and VLAN were effective defences against RA Flood Attack 3.  
 
Overall, the results showed that the performance of Debian 7.5.0 was better than Windows 
8.1. It was mainly because Debian 7.5.0 accepted a limited number of prefixes while 
Windows 8.1 accepted hundreds of prefixes during the attacks. The next chapter presents 
the summary, conclusions and future works. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Summary, Conclusions and Future Works 
  
This chapter covers the summary followed by the conclusions and future works. Section 7.1 
provides a discussion on the TCP throughput, TCP RTT and CPU utilisation results for 
Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0, which were gathered in Chapter 6. The efficacies of defence 
mechanisms against RA flood attacks with and without extension headers are discussed. 
Then each defence mechanism is discussed individually. Section 7.2 includes the 
conclusions. Finally, Section 7.3 provides suggestions for future research. 
 
7.1 Summary of Findings 
 
This section contains a summary of the findings from this research. 
 
7.1.1 TCP Throughput Results 
 
RA Flood Attack 1 and RA Flood Attack 2 caused the Windows 8.1 TCP throughput to drop 
from around 581 Mbps to 0 Mbps. Legitimate packets could not be transmitted during the 
attack. Debian 7.5.0 TCP throughput was around 635 Mbps before the attack. Legitimate 
packets could still be transmitted at around 2 to 4 Mbps during the attack. During RA Flood 
Attack 3, the throughput dropped from 581 Mbps to 393.8 Mbps and Debian 7.5.0 
throughput dropped from 635.3 Mbps to 435.4. Thus, legitimate packets could be transmitted 
at reduced rates on both operating systems. When effective defences were used during all 
three attacks, the TCP throughput results were similar to the results obtained prior to the 
attacks.  
 
7.1.2 TCP Round-trip Time Results 
 
RA Flood Attack 1 caused Windows 8.1 TCP RTT to increase significantly. During RA Flood 
Attack 2, the RTT results for Window 8.1 were even higher than the results obtained during 
RA Flood Attack 1. The Windows 8.1 RTT results were considerably lower during RA Flood 
Attack 3 compared to the RTT results obtained during the other two attacks. The RTT 
increased from 0.576 milliseconds to 0.953 milliseconds on Windows 8.1 and it increased 
from to 0.582 milliseconds to 0.885 milliseconds on Debian 7.5.0. When effective defences 
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were used during all three attacks, the TCP RTT results were similar to the results obtained 
prior to the attacks. 
  
7.1.3 CPU Utilisation Results 
 
CPU utilisation was expected increase on both Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0. However, the 
CPU utilisation on Debian 7.5.0 did not show any significant changes before and during the 
three attacks as well as after the defences were used. On the contrary, during RA Flood 
Attack 1 and RA Flood Attack 2, Windows 8.1 CPU utilisation reached 100% rapidly and 
dropped to around 18% on the monitoring computers. During RA Flood 3, the CPU utilisation 
only increased from 0% to 5%. 
 
During RA Flood Attack 1 and RA Flood Attack 2, the CPU utilisation on the victim 
computers reached 100% and then dropped to 0% because the computers lost their network 
connections so they could not receive any more malicious Router Advertisements. As for RA 
Flood Attack 3, the CPU utilisation reached also 5% for a few milliseconds then reached 0% 
when the computers lost their network connections. 
 
If the defences were effective, the CPU utilisation on Windows 8.1 was 0% during all three 
attacks. During RA Flood Attack 1 and RA Flood Attack 2, the CPU utilisation increased from 
0% to around 18% if the defences were not effective. Disable Router Discovery was the only 
exception, Disable Router Discovery was ineffective but it reduced the CPU utilisation from 
around 18 to 8%. As for RA Flood Attack 3, if the defences were ineffective the CPU 
utilisation remained constant at 5%. Disable Router Discovery did not make any difference to 
the CPU utilisation during RA Flood Attack 3. 
 
7.1.4 Similarities and Differences between the attacks 
 
All three attacks caused the victim Window 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 computers to lose their 
network connections as the computers updated their routing tables with malicious routing 
entries. However, the impacts of the three attacks were different on monitoring computers. 
 
As discussed in Section 5.2.6, RA Flood Attack 1 sent thousands of 1038-byte packets per 
second and RA Flood Attack 2 sent thousands of fragmented 1046-byte packets per second. 
Thus, during both attacks, the packets had a significant effect on the throughput and RTT 
results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0.  
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During RA Flood Attack 3, some fragments could be reassembled into 1302-byte Router 
Advertisements while others could not be reassembled as they were created from 
malformed packets. Since fewer Router Advertisements were received, they did not have a 
significant effect on throughput and RTT results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0. 
 
7.1.5 Defence Mechanisms against RA Flood Attack 1  
 
The average TCP throughput, TCP RTT and CPU utilisation results for both Windows 8.1 
and Debian 7.5.0 showed that ACL, RA Guard, Validate Source MAC and VLAN were 
effective defences against RA Flood Attack 1. When these defences were used, the TCP 
throughput and TCP RTT results became normal and the CPU utilisation on both Windows 
8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 did not show any significant changes.  
 
Disable Router Discovery was the only defence, which was ineffective; it could not increase 
the TCP throughput or reduce the TCP RTT significantly for both Windows 8.1 and Debian 
7.5.0. In addition, the CPU utilisation results for Windows 8.1 were not the same as they 
were before the attacks when the Disable Router Discovery method was used. 
 
7.1.6 Defence Mechanisms against RA Flood Attack 2  
 
The average TCP throughput, TCP RTT and CPU utilisation results for Windows 8.1 and 
Debian 7.5.0 showed that ACL, ACL Fragments, ACL Undetermined-transport and VLAN 
were effective defences against RA Flood Attack 2. The average values obtained when the 
four effective defences were used were close to the average value obtained before the 
attack was launched. The results also showed that RA Guard, Validate Source MAC and 
Disable Router Discovery were ineffective defences against the attack. The CPU utilisation 
results for Debian 7.5.0 did not show any significant changes when the ineffective defences 
were used. On the contrary, the defences could not reduce the CPU utilisation during the 
attack. 
 
7.1.7 Defence Mechanisms against RA Flood Attack 3 
 
The average TCP throughput, TCP RTT and CPU utilisation results on Windows 8.1 and 
Debian 7.5.0 showed that only VLAN and ACL Undetermined-transport were effective 
defences against RA Flood Attack 3. When these two defences were used, the results 
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became normal. When ACL, ACL Fragments and Disable Router Discovery were used, the 
average throughput results were more or less the same as the average throughput results 
recorded during the attack. Moreover, the CPU utilisation on Windows 8.1 was not normal 
when ACL, ACL Fragments and Disable Router Discovery were used. 
 
RA Guard and Validate Source MAC possibly exhausted the switch’s resources during RA 
Flood Attack 3. It was not possible to transmit legitimate packets during the attack. The tools 
used to gather TCP throughput and TCP RTT failed to establish connections when RA 
Guard and Validate Source MAC were used. Thus, the defences were too weak to be used 
against RA Flood Attack 3. 
 
7.1.8 Access Control Lists  
 
The ACL method was effective when it was used during RA Flood Attack 1 and RA Flood 
Attack 2. Two more ACLs were tested during RA Flood Attack 2 because the attack used 
packets with fragment extension headers. Section 3.4.1.3 provided details on how ACL 
Fragments and ACL Undetermined-transport can be used against attacks that exploit 
extension headers. ACL was not expected to be as effective as the other two ACLs because 
the ACLs are targeted at attacks that use extension headers. The experimental results 
showed that all three ACLs were equally effective during RA Flood Attack 2. However, if ACL 
is used, it will not require as many ACL entries as ACL Fragments and ACL Undetermined-
transport. 
 
ACL and ACL Fragments were able to identify and drop Router Advertisement 
packets/fragments during RA Flood Attack 1 and RA Flood Attack 2. During RA Flood Attack 
3, ACL failed to detect fragments that were created from malicious Router Advertisements. 
As a result, the fragments bypassed the switch. They were reassembled into malicious 
Router Advertisements at the destination computer. 
 
As discussed in Section 3.4.1.3, ACL Fragments dropped any non-initial fragments that did 
not have a ULP. For this reason, the rest of the fragments that bypassed the switch could 
not be used to reassemble the malicious Router Advertisements. For this reason, routing 
entries could not be detected at both Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 the computers with 
automatically configured IPv6 addresses did not lose their network connections when ACL 
Fragments was used. However, the results were not normal on the computers with statically 
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configured IPv6 addresses since ACL Fragments allowed numerous fragments to pass after 
dropping any non-initial fragments that did not have a ULP.  
 
When ACL Undetermined-transport was used, the switch dropped each initial fragment that 
did not have a ULP so the malicious Router Advertisements could not be reassembled when 
they reached the destination computer. As with ACL Fragments, ACL Undetermined-
transport allowed the rest of the fragments to pass. However, the fragments did not have any 
effect on the results. 
 
The difference between the two defence mechanisms was that in addition to preventing 
computers with statically configured IPv6 addresses from losing their network connections, 
ACL Undetermined-transport enabled the TCP Throughput, TCP RTT and CPU utilisation 
results to become normal. 
 
7.1.9 Disable Router Discovery  
 
Assigning static IPv6 addresses to Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 prevented them from 
losing their network connections during all three attacks. However, when static addresses 
were used during the attacks, Windows 8.1 continued to generate numerous routing entries 
using many malicious Router Advertisements. Debian 7.5.0 also generated routing entries 
but unlike Windows, it only generated 14 of them. 
 
During all three attacks, Disable Router Discovery prevented both Windows 8.1 and Debian 
7.5.0 from creating unnecessary routing entries from malicious Router Advertisements. 
Disable Router Discovery was mainly ineffective because it had to be configured at the 
computers instead of the switch. It could not prevent the masses of attack packets from 
causing network congestion thereby reducing TCP throughput and increasing the TCP RTT 
on both Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0. In addition, Windows 8.1 CPU utilisation was not 
normal when the defence was used. Therefore, Disable Router Discovery cannot be used to 
protect servers from Router Advertisement flood attacks, which normally use static 
addresses.  
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7.1.10 RA Guard and Validate Source MAC 
 
RA Guard and Validate Source MAC can easily be applied to an entire VLAN. They do not 
need to be configured on individual ports like ACLs. When RA Guard was used during RA 
Flood Attack 1, the results were similar to the results obtained when the other effective 
defences were used. RA Guard did not work during RA Flood Attack 2 and RA Flood Attack 
3. RA Guard was implemented using an additional option as discussed in Section 5.3.3. The 
option attempts to match the legitimate router’s address with the source address of Router 
Advertisements. The switch is supposed to drop packets if it is unable to find matches. This 
option possibly did not work during RA Flood Attack 2 and RA Flood Attack 3 because it 
looked for Router Advertisements. Since the attacks used fragmented packets, the switch 
could not identify that the fragments belonged to Router Advertisements as discussed in 
Section 3.2.1.1. 
 
During RA Flood Attack 2 and RA Flood Attack 3, Validate Source MAC failed to drop 
malicious fragments. Validate Source MAC worked during RA Flood Attack 1 because it was 
able to identify and drop malicious Router Advertisements as they arrived at the switch. It 
allowed legitimate Router Advertisements from the router to pass.  
 
The results showed that Validate Source MAC and RA Guard were equally effective when 
they were used against RA Flood Attack 1, which did not use fragment extension headers. 
However, fewer commands are required to configure Validate Source MAC compared to RA 
Guard and Validate Source MAC can protect the network from other spoofing-based attacks 
unlike RA Guard.  
 
7.1.11 VLAN 
 
The VLAN method was evaluated in this study because the RA flood attacks were expected 
to exhaust the switch’s resources causing the performance of the switch to deteriorate. For 
this reason, the attacks were expected to affect the performances of both the victim as well 
as the monitoring VLANs. However, experimental results proved otherwise.  
 
VLAN can isolate the attack traffic and reduce the impact of a RA Flood Attack on the entire 
network. However, during a RA flood attack, it will not be possible for hosts in the victim 
VLAN to communicate with hosts in another VLAN. 
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7.2 Conclusions 
 
 RA flood attacks can have significant impacts on TCP throughput and TCP RTT on 
Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0. However, they cannot affect the performance of 
Debian 7.5.0. On the other hand, Windows 8.1 can become slow or unresponsive 
during RA flood attacks.  
 
 Debian 7.5.0 only accepts a limited number of prefixes while Windows 8.1 has the 
ability to accept hundreds of prefixes. For this reason, Debian 7.5.0 outperformed 
Windows 8.1 in many of the experiments.  
 
 ACL, RA Guard, Validate Source MAC and VLAN are effective defences against RA 
flood attacks that do not use extension headers. Disable Router Discovery cannot be 
used against such attacks. 
 
 ACL, ACL Fragments, ACL Undetermined-transport and VLAN are effective defences 
against a RA flood attack, which uses fragment extension headers. Disable Router 
Discovery, RA Guard and Validate Source MAC cannot be used against such 
attacks. 
 
 Only ACL Undetermined-transport and VLAN are effective defences against RA flood 
attacks that use fragment and destination options headers. ACL, ACL Fragments, 
Disable Router Discovery, RA Guard and Validate Source MAC cannot be used 
against such attacks. 
 
 To protect the network from a RA flood attack that does not use extension headers, 
RA Guard or Validate Source MAC may be used. Both defences are equally effective 
however; RA Guard can only be used to protect the network from RA flood attacks 
whereas Validate Source MAC can be used against RA flood attacks and other 
spoofing-based attacks.  
 
 Disable Router Discovery requires computers to have static IPv6 addresses so that it 
can prevent them from using Router Advertisements to generate unnecessary IPv6 
addresses. Disable Router Discovery cannot increase the TCP throughput or reduce 
the TCP RTT during a RA flood attack. The attack packets cause network congestion 
and need to be dropped at the computers. Therefore, Disable Router Discovery 
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cannot be used to protect computers that require static addresses such as servers 
from RA flood attacks. 
 
 ACL can be used to protect the network from RA flood attacks that do not use 
extension headers and RA flood attacks that use fragment extension headers. 
  
 ACL Fragments can only prevent computers with automatically configured IPv6 
addresses from losing their network connections during a RA flood attack, which 
uses fragment and destination options headers. ACL Fragments works by dropping 
fragments that are required to reassemble malicious Router Advertisements. 
However, it cannot increase the TCP throughput or decrease the TCP RTT on 
Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 during the attack since it allows many fragments to 
bypass the switch. Even though these fragments cannot be used to reassemble 
malicious Router Advertisements, they need to be dropped because they compete 
with legitimate traffic. 
 
 ACL Undetermined-transport can protect the network from RA flood attacks that use 
packets with fragment and destination options headers. It prevents computers with 
automatically configured IPv6 addresses from losing their network connections. In 
addition, ACL Undetermined-transport does not allow the fragments sent during the 
attack to affect the TCP throughput, TCP RTT and CPU utilisation on Windows 8.1 
and Debian 7.5.0. ACL Undetermined-transport allows some fragments to bypass the 
switch but they do not affect the TCP throughput, TCP RTT and CPU utilisation on 
Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0. 
 
7.3 Future Works 
 
This research was conducted to evaluate a number of defences against three types of RA 
flood attacks. The following sections provide suggestions for future research on IPv6 DoS 
attacks.  
 
7.3.1 Spoofed Local or Remote Neighbour Solicitation Flood Attacks 
 
Neighbour Solicitation messages which were discussed in Section 2.4.2.2 and Section 
2.4.2.3 may be misused to launch DoS attacks on the local link or from a remote location 
(Small, 2013). Implementations against these attacks could be explored. 
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7.3.2 Neighbour Advertisement Attacks  
 
Neighbour Advertisement messages were discussed in Section 2.4.2.2 and Section 2.4.2.3. 
They can be used to launch link-local flooding based DoS attacks. A Neighbour 
Advertisement flood attack sends masses of Neighbour Advertisements to the target 
(Hauser 2014). IPv6 monitoring or securing tools against these attacks could be analysed.  
 
7.3.3 Multicast Listener Discovery Protocol Attacks 
 
To join or leave a group, interfaces use the Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) Protocol. 
MLD is also used by routers. They keep track of groups for each interface to which they 
forward packets. Attackers can launch DoS attacks against MLD (Frankel et al., 2010). 
Research could be conducted on defence mechanisms against MLD attacks.  
 
7.4 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter covered the summary, conclusions and future works. The TCP throughput, TCP 
RTT and CPU utilisation results for Windows 8.1 and Debian 7.5.0 were discussed followed 
by the efficacies of defence mechanisms against RA flood attacks with and without 
extension headers.  Each defence mechanism was also discussed individually. Then the 
conclusions were listed. Finally, suggestions for future research were provided. 
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Appendix A 
 
Results for RA Flood Attack 1 
Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
Before Attack     580.00    582.00    581.000 0.943 
During Attack         0.00        0.00        0.000 0.000 
ACL     580.00    582.00    580.900 0.876 
Disable Router Discovery         4.05        4.13        4.095 0.025 
VLAN     570.00    580.00     575.000 4.243 
Table 1: TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1 using Cisco 3560G. 
 
 
Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
Before Attack      572      582    578.900 3.843 
During Attack          0          0        0.000 0.000 
RA Guard      571      583    576.900 5.174 
Validate Source MAC      573      583    580.100 3.872 
Table 2: TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1 using Cisco 300-10. 
 
 
Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
Before Attack    634.00     636.00  635.300 0.823 
During Attack        3.50         4.41      4.123 0.403 
ACL    630.00     635.00  632.800 1.814 
Disable Router Discovery        4.36         4.49      4.419 0.044 
VLAN    630.00     632.00  630.500 0.850 
Table 3: TCP throughput results for Debian 7.5.0 using Cisco 3560G. 
 
 
Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
Before Attack    633.00    640.00    636.900 2.601 
During Attack        1.97        2.02        2.004 0.016 
RA Guard     631.00     637.00    632.900 1.911 
Validate Source MAC     634.00     638.00    635.100 1.197 
Table 4: TCP throughput results for Debian 7.5.0 using Cisco 300-10. 
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Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
Before Attack       0.570       0.582      0.576 0.004 
During Attack   120.692   136.933  128.479 5.401 
ACL       0.574       0.584      0.579 0.003 
Disable Router Discovery       1.900       2.097      1.965 0.072 
VLAN       0.593       0.607      0.600 0.006 
Table 5: TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 using Cisco 3560G. 
 
 
Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
Before Attack     0.592      0.599     0.594 0.002 
During Attack   52.671    56.398    54.425 1.237 
RA Guard     0.593      0.606      0.598 0.004 
Validate Source MAC     0.608      0.612      0.610 0.001 
Table 6: TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 using Cisco 300-10. 
 
 
Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
Before Attack 0.579 0.587 0.582 0.002 
During Attack 2.091 2.539 2.234 0.175 
ACL 0.578 0.600 0.584 0.008 
Disable Router Discovery 2.013 2.094 2.047 0.027 
VLAN 0.585 0.598 0.592 0.004 
Table 7: TCP RTT results for Debian 7.5.0 using Cisco 3560G. 
 
 
Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
Before Attack 0.581 0.591 0.586 0.004 
During Attack 2.125 2.158 2.142 0.013 
RA Guard 0.581 0.598 0.588 0.005 
Validate Source MAC 0.590 0.601 0.594 0.004 
Table 8: TCP RTT results for Debian 7.5.0 using Cisco 300-10. 
 
 
Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
Before Attack          0       0.00       0.00 0.000 
During Attack        18     18.60     18.18 0.290 
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Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
ACL          0       0.00       0.00 0.000 
Disable Router Discovery          8       8.00       8.00 0.000 
RA Guard          0       0.00       0.00 0.000 
Validate Source MAC          0       0.00       0.00 0.000 
VLAN          0       0.00       0.00 0.000 
Table 9: CPU utilisation results for Windows 8.1. 
 
 
Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
Before Attack 0.28 0.31 0.30 0.010 
During Attack 0.28 0.31 0.29 0.012 
ACL 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.007 
Disable Router Discovery 0.28 0.31 0.29 0.010 
RA Guard 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.005 
Validate Source MAC 0.28 0.31 0.30 0.009 
VLAN 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.008 
Table 10: CPU utilisation results for Debian 7.5.0. 
 
 
Results for RA Flood Attack 2 
Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
Before Attack     580.00     582.00    581.000 0.943 
During Attack         0.00         0.00        0.000 0.000 
ACL     571.00     582.00    577.900 4.864 
ACL Fragments     575.00     582.00    579.400 2.171 
ACL Undetermined-transport     569.90     579.00    569.900 4.095 
Disable Router Discovery         4.11         4.29        4.194 0.060 
VLAN     571.00     579.00    575.900 3.604 
Table 11: TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1 using Cisco 3560G. 
 
 
Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
Before Attack        572     582   578.900        3.843 
During Attack           0         0       0.000      0 
RA Guard           0         0       0.000      0 
Validate Source MAC           0         0       0.000      0 
Table 12: TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1 using Cisco 300-10. 
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Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
Before Attack    634.00      636.00    635.300 0.823 
During Attack        3.28          4.44        4.131 0.456 
ACL    632.00      636.00    633.500 1.650 
ACL Fragments    629.00      638.00    632.900 3.510 
ACL Undetermined-transport    628.00      637.00    632.400 3.864 
Disable Router Discovery        4.33          4.43        4.364 0.033 
VLAN    628.00      632.00    630.500 1.434 
Table 13: TCP throughput results for Debian 7.5.0 using Cisco 3560G. 
 
 
Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
Before Attack   633.00     640.00   636.900 2.601 
During Attack       1.96         2.02       2.001 0.021 
RA Guard       1.96         2.04       1.980 0.026 
Validate Source MAC       1.98         2.02       2.004 0.013 
Table 14: TCP throughput results for Debian 7.5.0 using Cisco 300-10. 
 
 
Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
Before Attack       0.570      0.582     0.576         0.004 
During Attack   339.014  376.160  355.042       12.854 
ACL       0.600      0.605      0.602         0.002 
ACL Fragments       0.579      0.588      0.582         0.003 
ACL Undetermined-transport       0.570      0.587      0.581         0.005 
Disable Router Discovery       1.954      2.141      2.038         0.060 
VLAN       0.589      0.609      0.596         0.006 
Table 15: TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 using Cisco 3560G. 
 
 
Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
Before Attack       0.592       0.599       0.594 0.002 
During Attack   127.023   139.559   132.719 5.133 
RA Guard   128.027   139.196   133.183 3.780 
Validate Source MAC   124.975   139.206   132.499 5.005 
Table 16: TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1 using Cisco 300-10. 
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Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
Before Attack 0.579 0.587 0.582 0.002 
During Attack 2.081 2.276 2.159 0.077 
ACL 0.579 0.601 0.588 0.008 
ACL Fragments 0.583 0.592 0.586 0.003 
ACL Undetermined-transport 0.584 0.596 0.590 0.004 
Disable Router Discovery 2.015 2.109 2.065 0.025 
VLAN 0.590 0.599 0.595 0.004 
Table 17: TCP RTT results for Debian 7.5.0 using Cisco 3560G. 
 
 
Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
Before Attack 0.581 0.591 0.586 0.004 
During Attack 2.114 2.153 2.135 0.013 
RA Guard 2.049 2.175 2.127 0.038 
Validate Source MAC 2.114 2.163 2.141 0.020 
Table 18: TCP RTT results for Debian 7.5.0 using Cisco 300-10. 
 
 
Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
Before Attack         0.0      0.00      0.00 0.000 
During Attack       17.5    18.00    17.91 0.191 
ACL         0.0      0.00      0.00 0.000 
ACL Fragments         0.0      0.00      0.00 0.000 
ACL Undetermined-transport         0.0      0.00      0.00 0.000 
Disable Router Discovery         8.0      8.00      8.00 0.000 
RA Guard       16.2      17.8    17.00 0.452 
Validate Source MAC       15.4      15.7    15.53 0.082 
VLAN         0.0        0.0      0.00 0.000 
Table 19: CPU Utilisation results for Windows 8.1. 
 
 
Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
Before Attack 0.28 0.31 0.30 0.010 
During Attack 0.25 0.28 0.27 0.011 
ACL 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.007 
ACL Fragments 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.001 
ACL Undetermined-transport 0.22 0.25 0.24 0.009 
 
124 
 
 
Disable Router Discovery 0.23 0.26 0.25 0.012 
RA Guard 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.008 
Validate Source MAC 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.007 
VLAN 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.005 
Table 20: CPU utilisation results for Debian 7.5.0. 
 
 
Results for RA Flood Attack 3 
Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
Before Attack 580 582 581.0 0.943 
During Attack 391 397 393.8 1.687 
ACL 405 421 411.9 5.547 
ACL Fragments 424 429 426.6 1.430 
ACL Undetermined-transport 565 575 570.5 3.028 
Disable Router Discovery 416 419 417.1 0.994 
VLAN 570 581 576.7 4.398 
Table 21: TCP throughput results for Windows 8.1. 
 
 
Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
Before Attack 634 636 635.3 0.823 
During Attack 435 436 435.4 0.516 
ACL 437 437 437.0 0.000 
ACL Fragments 452 453 452.7 0.483 
ACL Undetermined-transport 624 629 626.4 1.838 
Disable Router Discovery 435 444 438.7 4.373 
VLAN 629 632 630.8 1.230 
Table 22: TCP throughput results for Debian 7.5.0. 
 
 
Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
Before Attack 0.570 0.582 0.576 0.004 
During Attack 0.927 0.977 0.953 0.019 
ACL 0.683 0.722 0.703 0.016 
ACL Fragments 0.661 0.693 0.677 0.012 
ACL Undetermined-transport 0.642 0.661 0.657 0.006 
Disable Router Discovery 0.635 0.707 0.669 0.028 
VLAN 0.577 0.588 0.583 0.003 
Table 23: TCP RTT results for Windows 8.1. 
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Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
Before Attack 0.579 0.587 0.582 0.002 
During Attack 0.859 0.904 0.885 0.014 
ACL 0.637 0.693 0.663 0.020 
ACL Fragments 0.638 0.655 0.648 0.007 
ACL Undetermined-transport 0.582 0.594 0.588 0.005 
Disable Router Discovery 0.610 0.690 0.662 0.028 
VLAN 0.594 0.603 0.599 0.003 
Table 24: TCP RTT results for Debian 7.5.0. 
 
 
Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
Before Attack 0 0 0 0 
During Attack 5 5 5 0 
ACL 5 5 5 0 
ACL Fragments 5 5 5 0 
ACL Undetermined-transport 0 0 0 0 
Disable Router Discovery 5 5 5 0 
VLAN 0 0 0 0 
Table 25: CPU Utilisation results for Windows 8.1. 
 
 
Scenario Minimum Maximum Average Standard 
Deviation 
Before Attack 0.28 0.31 0.30 0.010 
During Attack 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.007 
ACL 0.22 0.25 0.24 0.009 
ACL Fragments 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.007 
ACL Undetermined-transport 0.27 0.30 0.28 0.011 
Disable Router Discovery 0.30 0.32 0.32 0.008 
VLAN 0.28 0.31 0.29 0.007 
Table 26: CPU utilisation results for Debian 7.5.0. 
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Appendix B 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Windows 8.1 IPv6 configuration before RA Flood Attack 1. 
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Figure 2: Windows 8.1 IPv6 configuration during RA Flood Attack 1. 
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Appendix C 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Debian 7.5.0 IPv6 configuration before RA Flood Attack 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Debian 7.5.0 IPv6 configuration during RA Flood Attack 1. 
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Appendix D 
 
 
 
Figure 5: CPU utilisation on the Windows 8.1 victim computer during RA Flood Attack 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: CPU utilisation on the Windows 8.1 monitoring computer during RA Flood Attack1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
